Impact assessment in special warfare by Searle, Garrett M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2017-12
Impact assessment in special warfare
Searle, Garrett M.
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/56802
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.














Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 








Thesis Advisor:  Robert Burks 
Second Reader: Douglas Borer 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB  
No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork 
Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank) 
2. REPORT DATE  
December 2017 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN SPECIAL WARFARE 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S) Garrett M. Searle 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 




9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number _DD-N-2017.0083____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
The impact of operations that build partner capacity to counter extremist groups is difficult to measure. 
Assessments usually focus on the outcomes of training (was capacity built?) but not the ultimate effect of 
that new capacity (was a violent extremist group degraded as a result?). To address this shortfall, this 
thesis argues that a method known as impact assessment, used by the development and law enforcement 
communities to evaluate countering violent extremism (CVE) programming and policing strategy, can be 
applied to assess the social impact of military capacity-building efforts with similar goals. To demonstrate 
that utility, the author examines the case of U.S. engagement in Niger and develops a theory of change to 
describe the logical path from capacity-building activities to their intended effect of countering extremist 
groups. Then, to test impact assessment in practice, the author conducts an ex post facto, quasi-
experimental assessment of the treatment effect of U.S. engagement in Niger. The substantive results of 
this study identify impact that was otherwise hidden in observational data and highlight the need for more 
rigorous assessment. The author recommends the application of impact assessment methods to improve the 
theoretical understanding of cause and effect, identify real impact, learn from unexpected results, and 
motivate adaptation and innovation.  
 
 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  
special warfare, irregular warfare, impact assessment, impact evaluation, theory of change, 
countering violent extremism, foreign internal defense, measures of effectiveness 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
105 

















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii 




Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
 
 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN SPECIAL WARFARE 
 
 
Garrett M. Searle 
Major, United States Army 
B.A., Wheaton College, 2006 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 






















Chair, Department of Defense Analysis 
 
 iv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v 
ABSTRACT 
The impact of operations that build partner capacity to counter extremist groups is 
difficult to measure. Assessments usually focus on the outcomes of training (was capacity 
built?) but not the ultimate effect of that new capacity (was a violent extremist group 
degraded as a result?). To address this shortfall, this thesis argues that a method known as 
impact assessment, used by the development and law enforcement communities to 
evaluate countering violent extremism (CVE) programming and policing strategy, can be 
applied to assess the social impact of military capacity-building efforts with similar goals. 
To demonstrate that utility, the author examines the case of U.S. engagement in Niger and 
develops a theory of change to describe the logical path from capacity-building activities 
to their intended effect of countering extremist groups. Then, to test impact assessment in 
practice, the author conducts an ex post facto, quasi-experimental assessment of the 
treatment effect of U.S. engagement in Niger. The substantive results of this study 
identify impact that was otherwise hidden in observational data and highlight the need for 
more rigorous assessment. The author recommends the application of impact assessment 
methods to improve the theoretical understanding of cause and effect, identify real 
impact, learn from unexpected results, and motivate adaptation and innovation.  
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The impact of operations designed to build partner capacity to counter extremist 
groups and insurgencies is difficult to measure. After years of U.S. forces advising and 
assisting partners in Africa, South-East Asia, and the Middle East, the connections 
between those efforts and their intended effect are not well understood.  
In 1962, Robert McNamara was developing a system to measure the progress of 
the military assistance effort in South Vietnam. He had a list of measurements that he 
considered vital for the assessment of that campaign: control of lines of communication 
and critical infrastructure, the number of pacified villages, and, most importantly, the 
number of dead Viet Cong. When Brigadier General Edward Lansdale appeared in his 
office, McNamara asked him what he thought of the list. Lansdale had been the architect 
of the successful Philippine counterinsurgency effort against the Hukbalahap rebellion 
and had spent a considerable amount of time in Vietnam in the early years of American 
involvement there. Looking at McNamara’s list, he concluded that measuring those 
factors would lead to misplaced confidence in the progress of the campaign. Lansdale felt 
that the most important factor was missing—what he called the “X factor,” or “the human 
factor.”1 To him, the most vital component was “What the people out there on the 
battlefield really feel; which side they want to see win and which side they’re for at the 
moment. That’s the only way you’re going to ever have this war decided.”2 McNamara 
was disappointed by Lansdale’s answer and erased his note about the “X factor,” 
dismissing Lansdale and his suggestion as “too unconventional.”3  
Almost 50 years later, when General Stanley McChrystal assumed command of 
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2009, appreciation 
for the “human factor” in counterinsurgency had grown considerably. In his initial 
assessment, McChrystal noted that “Our strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain 
                                                 
1 Howard Jones, Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the 
Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 185. 
2 Jones, Death of a Generation, 185. 
3 Cecil B. Currey, Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American (Washington: Brassey’s, 1998), 2.  
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or destroying insurgent forces; our objective must be the population. In the struggle to 
gain the support of the people, every action we take must enable this effort.”4 Despite 
his emphasis on the population and its role in the counterinsurgency fight, 
McChrystal observed that assessments tended to measure progress primarily based on 
“kinetic events,” which prevented “an accurate assessment of the insurgents’ 
intentions, progress, and level of control of the population.”5 This incongruity 
continues to plague U.S. irregular warfare efforts, particularly those that are indirect, 
where the focus is on building the capacity of a host-nation military to address an 
extremist or insurgent threat. The special operations forces engaged in those efforts 
lack the necessary tools and expertise to assess the specific impact of their efforts on 
Lansdale’s “X factor.” Focusing specifically on capacity-building efforts in Africa, this 
thesis explores that deficit and identifies the method known as impact assessment as a 
means of addressing it. 
A. TWO SIMILAR ATTACKS, TWO DIFFERENT OUTCOMES 
As dusk fell on June 3, 2016, soldiers from the Armed Forces of Niger looked 
south from their small outpost across the dry scrubland and the outskirts of Bosso town, 
in the remote southeastern corner of Niger. Beyond the town was the Komadougou River 
and Nigeria’s Borno State, home to the violent extremist group Boko Haram. As the 
day’s heat gave way to a cooling breeze from the south, it appeared to bring with it small 
fingers of rising dust, barely visible in the fading light. In an instant, the serenity was 
shattered by the clatter of automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades screeching 
out of the bush and exploding on the makeshift dirt and sand-bagged battlements of the 
Nigerien army. Groups of Boko Haram fighters, crammed into cut-down Toyota pickups 
and mounted two and three at a time on cheap Chinese motorcycles, emerged from the 
darkness and swarmed towards the small outpost, intent on driving out the forces there 
and capturing the town. The fight was over quickly, the Army was forced to withdraw 
                                                 
4 Stanley McChrystal, “COMISAF Initial Assessment (Unclassified),” August 30, 2009, published by 
The Washington Post, September 21, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/09/21/AR2009092100110.html. 
5 McChrystal, “COMISAF Initial Assessment.” 
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from their position with 32 soldiers killed and 67 wounded. Boko Haram spent the night 
torching buildings and looting the town, leaving early the next morning before the 
Nigeriens could organize a counter-attack.6 
Nine months later, a large force of Boko Haram fighters was once again moving 
from their stronghold in Nigeria for a raid across the border in Niger. Their target was the 
small Nigerien outpost in Gueskerou, 20 miles southwest of Bosso. This time, however, 
they met a different fate. The local population observed and reported the movement of 
these forces toward Gueskerou, and the Nigerien Army moved a rapid response battalion, 
a partner force of U.S. Special Forces advisors, into position for an ambush. The Boko 
Haram fighters were caught flat-footed and exposed—pushed back into Nigeria with 57 
killed and many more wounded.7 They had no response for a Nigerien force that seemed 
to anticipate their moves. The flow of information that facilitated this rapid and effective 
response was a result of efforts by the Nigerien Army’s civil-military affairs (referred-to 
by the French acronym ACM) forces, partnered with U.S. Army Civil Affairs (CA) 
teams, to build more productive relationships with at-risk populations. 
The outcome seen in this second example illustrates the intent of this and other 
capacity-building efforts in Africa: to counter violent extremist organizations like Boko 
Haram and reduce their hold on vulnerable populations on the continent.8 Ideally, some of 
that effect is lethal: killing and capturing extremists; but much of it is non-lethal: building 
a more competent, professional, and engaged military force that can garner the support of 
the population and reduce the influence of extremist groups. Achieving the latter goal 
means increasing perceptions of national government legitimacy and influence in areas 
impacted by an insurgency or non-state group and building capability to produce 
relationships that support security force action against those groups—like the 
relationships that supported the Nigerien counter-attack. In many conflicts where the U.S. 
                                                 
 6 “Boko Haram attack in Niger ‘kills 32 soldiers’,” Aljazeera, June 4, 2016, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/boko-haram-attack-niger-kills-32-soldiers-nigeria-
160604125912477.html. 
 7 “Niger Forces Kill 57 Members of Boko Haram: Defense Ministry,” Reuters, April 10, 2017, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security-idUSKBN17C29B. 
 8 Donald C. Bolduc, Commander’s Narrative: Ongoing Discussion on Special Operations in Africa, 
(Stuttgart, DE: U.S. Special Operations Command Africa, 2016). 
 4 
military is engaged, responsibility for this non-lethal component falls on Civil Affairs 
forces, but each component providing advice and assistance is involved because the 
forces they train and equip will inevitably interact with civilian populations and impact 
the relationship between them and the state. These relationships solidify gains made 
through combat operations and strengthen the competitive advantage of the supported 
state as it consolidates control in areas of contested sovereignty.  
Unfortunately, anecdotes like the one above do not provide the empirical means 
to understand how and why the partner capacity being built by U.S. forces is impacting 
the relationship between governments and their population. This problem is not unique to 
Civil Affairs forces—in general, capacity-building operations suffer from an inability to 
connect that new capacity to impacts on the critical relationship between partner forces 
and populations whose loyalty is necessary in the fight against extremist groups. There 
presently exists no mechanism to learn and adapt based on evidence of success or failure, 
making it difficult to aggregate those effects in support of broader political-military 
objectives. A number of conceptual frameworks have been proposed to measure the 
effectiveness of stability operations and this type of capacity building.9 However, their 
recommendations were specific to the direct approach of counterinsurgency in Iraq and 
Afghanistan or focused on training program outcomes, rather than their specific impact or 
effect, thus leading to the type of misplaced confidence described by General Lansdale. 
Certainly, commanders need to understand the effectiveness of a training program in 
producing capable forces and establishing a productive bi-lateral relationship, but they 
also need to understand what effect those forces are having on the relative strength of the 
enemy or within the populations they serve. Ultimately, investment in building the 
capacity of our partners should be measured based on these higher-order goals. Joint and 
service doctrine and existing military practice do not provide sufficient information or 
adequate tools for this purpose. 
                                                 
9 Jan Osburg, Christopher Paul, Lisa Saum-Manning, Dan Madden, and Leslie Adrienne Payne, 
Assessing Locally Focused Stability Operations, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014); Christopher Paul, 
Brian Gordon, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Lisa Saum-Manning, Beth Grill, Colin P. Clarke, Heather Peterson, 
A Building Partner Capacity Assessment Framework: Tracking Inputs, Outputs, Outcomes, Disrupters, and 
Workarounds, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015). 
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B. RESEARCH FOCUS 
To help address the assessment shortfall demonstrated above, this thesis looks 
beyond the Department of Defense (DOD) assessment paradigm and identifies potentially 
useful assessment mechanisms from other social science disciplines. Programs 
implemented by the development and law enforcement communities to counter violent 
extremism (CVE) and evaluate policing strategy use a form of evaluation known as 
impact assessment to understand their effect.10 Impact assessments differ from traditional 
measures of effectiveness by constructing a logic model of cause and effect, called a 
theory of change, and then using that theory to guide experimental or quasi-experimental 
assessment design with a defined counterfactual. This thesis argues that these methods 
are effective tools to assess civil-military capacity building and other components of 
special warfare (SW) campaigns, and demonstrates that utility through their application 
within the context of an ongoing special warfare effort. Since these methods are already 
in wide use by interagency and other unified action partners, their application by SW 
practitioners would aid in what Melton and Holshek call the “incorporation of civilian 
and military assets under a coherent, strategic civil-military conceptual framework that 
addresses the gulf between people and their system of governance.”11 
In much of the recent literature about assessment in irregular war, and 
consistently in my conversations with participants in these conflicts, the question seems 
to be about metrics—“How can we find the right metrics to measure effectiveness?”; or, 
“What is the right set of metrics to link tactical actions to effects at the operational or 
strategic level?”12 I want to be clear that the goal of this thesis is NOT to identify some 
new set of metrics that will definitively answer those questions. Rather, it proposes a 
                                                 
10 The development sector refers to assessment as “monitoring and evaluation,” and thus uses the term 
“impact evaluation” to describe the same processes that are referred to here as impact assessment. These 
terms are synonymous. See US Agency for International Development, USAID Evaluation Policy 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, 2011 (Updated 2016)), 
www.usaid.gov/evaluation/policy. 
11 Kevin Melton and Christopher Holshek, “Symposium Workshop Report,” in 2016-2017 Civil 
Affairs Issue Papers: Leveraging Civil Affairs, ed. Christopher Holshek (Carlisle, PA: Peacekeeping and 
Stability Operations Institute), xxi. 
12 See Jonathan Schroden, “Why Operations Assessments Fail: It’s Not Just the Metrics,” Naval War 
College Review 64, no. 4 (2011): 89–102. His note 4 offers a comprehensive list of metrics critiques and 
recommended structures for measuring progress in irregular war. 
 6 
philosophical choice to more diligently pursue knowledge of the real impact of operations 
at the tactical level, so that the impact can be interpreted and aggregated at higher levels 
with much greater confidence. The purpose of this thesis is not to make specific 
recommendations about what to measure, but rather about how to measure, in order that 
we can gain a greater understanding of the specific impact of actions taken within the 
conflict environment. 
C. APPROACH 
This thesis employs a mixed-methods approach, using literature review, input 
from subject matter experts, and a quantitative study of existing survey data to both frame 
the problem and identify and test a potential solution. The impact assessment 
demonstration focuses on special operations engagement in Niger, in northwest Africa, 
where U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) have been advising and assisting the 
Nigerien Armed Forces (known by the French acronym FAN) for several years.13 The 
U.S. Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) strategy there includes efforts 
to address root causes of extremism, counter extremist narratives, and improve the links 
between populations and the legitimate government.14 Based on these characteristics, the 
SOF engagement effort in Niger is a good fit to test the utility of impact assessment 
methodologies. 
D. FINDINGS 
The primary contribution of this thesis is demonstrating the application of 
rigorous impact assessment methodology to indirect special warfare campaigns, as an 
effective means to measure their impact on violent extremist groups. The demonstration 
has two primary components. The first is the application of the method known as theory 
of change, to describe a logical pathway from non-lethal capacity building to the desired 
effect of countering violent extremist organizations (C-VEO). I argue that this method, 
                                                 
13 The former SOCAFRICA commander, BG Donald Bolduc, often said that “We’re not at war in 
Africa, but our African partners are.” Donald C. Bolduc, "A View from the CT Foxhole: Brigadier General 
Donald C. Bolduc, Commander, Special Operations Command Africa," Interview by Brian Dodwell, CTC 
Sentinel 9, no. 5 (May 2016): 8. 
14 Bolduc, “View from the Foxhole,” 7-10. 
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which is commonly used as the foundation for impact assessment in other fields, has 
wide utility within the special warfare context and would greatly aid in the alignment of 
special operations with the activities of other government agencies and civilian 
organizations working in parallel. The second component of the demonstration is the 
application of impact assessment methods to real data from a special operations capacity-
building exercise in order to test their utility in the special warfare context. By 
restructuring this existing data into a quasi-experimental design and applying analysis 
methods from the social sciences, I show that impact assessment is productive in 
identifying effects that were otherwise hidden in observational data—confirming its value 
for evaluation of special warfare activities. 
Although it is not the intention of this thesis to illuminate new information about 
the efficacy of SOF engagement vis-à-vis the population, the substantive results of the 
impact assessment are significant. The assessment identifies a nearly equal and opposing 
impact of capacity-building activities on confidence in U.S. and Nigerien institutions, 
indicating that civilian populations can respond selectively to the component elements of 
a coalition, and that an increase in the visible presence of foreign forces may impact 
attitudes toward the host nation government. This result is both encouraging and 
frustrating and should provide motivation for further study of the social impact of special 
warfare engagements and exercises. Better assessment is needed to provide the necessary 
information to adjust the common understanding that guides these operations, so that the 
intended effect can be achieved. If the goal is to strengthen the competitive advantage of 
legitimate governance against violent extremist groups, then capacity-building activities 
should be focused on increasing military capability and improving popular confidence in 
that governance. This thesis demonstrates that theory of change methodology and quasi-
experimental impact assessment are productive means for evaluating the real effect of 
special warfare activities and adapting our approach to achieve that focus.  
E. THE WAY AHEAD 
In Chapter II, I frame the problem in terms of the recent literature on assessment 
within the DOD generally, and within the context of capacity building and special 
 8 
warfare more specifically. I then look outside of the defense bureaucracy to other foreign 
service agencies and the law enforcement community to identify impact assessment as a 
best practice for understanding program/policy effects. 
In Chapter III, I demonstrate how the concept of a theory of change, widely used 
within the fields listed above, can serve as a foundation for impact assessment. Based on 
the paradigm of “ungoverned spaces,” commonly used by special warfare practitioners to 
describe the environment where insurgencies and terrorists proliferate, I develop a theory 
of change that describes the logical pathway from capacity building to desired effect 
within those spaces. 
In order to test the viability of impact assessment methods within the special 
warfare context, in Chapter IV I conduct an ex post facto, quasi-experimental assessment 
of the treatment effect of SOF engagement in Niger during the Flintlock exercise in 2015. 
The assessment uses a difference-in-differences (DD) design to compare the change in 
institutional confidence among populations in areas that were exposed to SOF 
engagement (or its descendent effect) to that in areas that were not exposed to the 
treatment. In order to improve causal inference, I use matching to create treatment and 
control groups that are similar on a range of potentially disruptive variables.  
In Chapter V, I interpret the results of that impact assessment and their 
implications for the theory of change developed previously. This shows how impact 
assessment would create a cycle (Figure 1) of improved theory, improved methods and 
actions, more focused (targeted) effort, and improve the assessment process itself. I then 
conclude with a series of recommendations based on my findings and suggestions for 
future research and action. 
 9 
  
Figure 1.  Cycle of theory, action, and assessment 
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II. FRAMING THE PROBLEM AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
A. OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT STRUGGLES IN 
COUNTERINSURGENCY 
The ideas of assessment and evaluation have been a part of the DOD culture for 
decades and in many ways, the DOD served as a type of clearinghouse for evaluation 
frameworks and philosophies that expanded into the civil sector.15 Much of that 
evaluation was internally focused, related to efficiency for procurement, maintenance, 
and logistics. More recently, the defense literature on operations assessment has been 
motivated by the complex operating environments encountered by U.S. and NATO forces 
during the counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is a mountain of 
writing about the right way and the wrong way to assess these operations and the 
inadequacies of the military and the larger national security enterprise in assessing 
operations and campaigns for progress toward established goals. Common culprits for 
these failures include inadequate doctrine, disengaged or uninterested leaders, a lack of 
training for planners and practitioners, unclear or overly-ambitious goals, environmental 
complexity, and even a lack of resources designated for assessment.16  
The lack of consistent and substantive doctrine on the concept of operational 
assessment is a common theme among critiques of the efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.17 
                                                 
15 Harry P. Hatry, Performance Measurement: Getting Results (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute 
Press, 1999), xiii.  
16 These concepts will be explored in the following paragraphs. For writing on doctrine, see note 17 
below; for training, see note 22; for discussion on the impact of overly-ambitious goals, see Christopher 
Paul, "Foundations for Assessment: The Hierarchy of Evaluation and the Importance of Articulating a 
Theory of Change," Small Wars Journal 9, no. 7 (2013): 4, and Stephen Downes-Martin, “Operations 
Assessment in Afghanistan Is Broken,” Naval War College Review 64, no. 4 (2011): 103–124; for 
disinterested leaders, see Schroden, “Why Operations Assessments Fail,” 89–102; environmental 
complexity is a common theme, but a good example is Jason Campbell and Michael O’Hanlon, “Measuring 
Progress in Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, 13 July 2007. 
17 Christopher R. Rate and Dennis M. Murphy, Can’t Count It, Can’t Change It: Assessing Influence 
Operations Effectiveness, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 14, 2011); William 
Gregor, “Military Planning Systems and Stability Operations,” Prism 1 (June 2010): 99–114; Jan Osburg, 
Christopher Paul, Lisa Saum-Manning, Dan Madden, and Leslie Adrienne Payne, Assessing Locally 
Focused Stability Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014); Ben Connable, Embracing the Fog of 
War: Assessment and Metrics in Counterinsurgency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1086.html. 
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Schroden describes both joint and service doctrine as favoring definitions of assessment 
categories over prescriptive information on how to actually go about designing and 
implementing an assessment methodology.18 He describes joint doctrine as being very 
thorough in its admonition of the need to conduct assessment and the potential benefits 
but providing very little guidance on how it could or should be accomplished. His 
assessment of service doctrine is a little more promising in terms of volume, but not in 
terms of its quality or utility. He describes FM 5–0, Operations Process, as including a 
significant contradiction by at once discouraging the commitment of valuable time and 
energy to assessment schemes and then later admonishing the need to “devote the time, 
effort, and energy needed to properly uncover connections between causes and effects.”19 
That level of understanding about the environment and the impact of a unit’s actions 
upon it certainly requires a rigorous assessment methodology. 
It is encouraging that there seems to be some recent progress on the inclusion of 
more rigorous assessment content in joint and service doctrine. Paul et al. cite a number 
of ongoing efforts to encourage better assessment practice through improved doctrine. 
This includes the integration of more thorough assessment guidance in Joint Publications 
3–0, Joint Operations, and 5–0, Joint Operational Planning, and a new chapter on 
assessments in the recent revision of JP 3–13, Information Operations.20 Directly 
acknowledging the weaknesses of current joint doctrine, the Joint Staff J-7 published a 
handbook for assessment planning and execution in 2011, much of which has now been 
included in the most recent revisions of Joint Publication 5–0.21 
                                                 
18 Schroden, “Why Operations Assessments Fail.” 
19 Schroden, “Why Operations Assessments Fail,” 92. Quoted text from Department of the Army, The 
Operations Process, FM 5-0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2010), 6-7. 
20 Christopher Paul, Jessica Yeats, Colin P. Clarke, Miriam Matthews, and Lauren Skrabala, Assessing 
and Evaluating Department of Defense Efforts to Inform, Influence, and Persuade: Desk Reference, (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2015), www.rand.org/t/RR809z1. 
21 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander’s Handbook for Assessment Planning and Execution, (Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2011). 
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In addition to doctrine, a lack of training is often cited as a reason for failures in 
operational assessment.22 This includes confusion about who should be doing assessment 
and what training they need to do it well. Pre-deployment training for units conducting 
stability operations and counterinsurgency is wholly lacking on assessment-related 
training, so capability is completely dependent on the personality and educational 
background of the individuals involved.23 At the operational level, the task of assessment 
is often given to operations analysts. These individuals typically have a strong 
background in quantitative methods, but may have little understanding of the effects of 
friendly actions on the environment and how to measure them.24 They also may lack a 
strong background in the qualitative approaches that are often required to gain a full 
picture of what is happening on the ground.25 
 Another argument regarding the difficulties of assessment in Iraq and 
Afghanistan is that assessments in these conflicts were overly centralized and overly 
quantitative.26 Connable argues that this represents a perplexing departure from 
counterinsurgency doctrine and theory that emphasizes a complex and decentralized 
operating environment that necessitates a localized approach based on a mission 
command philosophy. He argues that “incongruity between decentralized and complex 
[counterinsurgency (COIN)] operations and centralized, decontextualized assessment has 
led military staffs to rely on ad hoc assessment methods that leave policymakers and the 
public dissatisfied with U.S. COIN campaign assessments.”27 From these critiques, a 
number of recommendations have emerged for more balanced approaches to assessing 
the progress of counterinsurgency and stability operations, where metrics are combined 
                                                 
22 Schroden, “Why Operations Assessments Fail,” 95; Jan Osburg, et al., Assessing Locally Focused 
Stability Operations, 32-34; Rate and Murphy, Can’t Count It, Can’t Change It, 9. 
23 Osburg, et al., Assessing Locally Focused Stability Operations, 34. 
24 Schroden, “Why Operations Assessments Fail,” 97. 
25 Osburg, et al., Assessing Locally Focused Stability Operations, 34. 
26 Connable, Embracing the Fog of War. 
27 Connable, Embracing the Fog of War, xv. 
 14 
with localized commander-centric qualitative assessment to gain a more complete 
understanding of the situation and the progress that is being made.28  
The approaches and recommendations in these references deal with assessing the 
over-all progress of a massive and complex campaign. None of them deal with the 
problem of assigning causality to specific actions taken by the counterinsurgent. Leaders 
within the irregular warfare (IW) campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have often included 
surveys and social science method in campaign assessments, primarily as a means to 
measure and aggregate diffuse effects into an assessment of over-all campaign progress.29 
However, the results were not particularly useful because, as Blanken and Lepore 
observe, the assessments tended to “devolve into simply gauging the environment, with 
little understanding as to how changes in that environment are the result of military 
activities.”30 Making that link between components of the campaign and their real impact 
in the specific social context where they are employed requires the use of more rigorous 
social science methods and the identification of a counterfactual.  
Additionally, the majority of the literature presented to this point is focused on 
situations where the organization doing the assessment is directly involved in the fighting 
in a designated theater of armed conflict. What about scenarios in which an indirect, 
special operations-centric approach is being implemented? These approaches, referred to 
broadly as special warfare, have been highlighted as a small-footprint, low-cost 
alternative large-scale military intervention.31 They rely heavily on special operations 
                                                 
28 Downes-Martin, “Operations Assessment in Afghanistan Is Broken”; Osburg, et al., “Assessing 
Locally Focused Stability Operations.”; Connable, Embracing the Fog of War; Morgan L. Courtney, In the 
Balance: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, 2005); Gregor, “Military Planning Systems and Stability Operations,” 111; Campbell, Jason, 
Michael E. O’Hanlon, and Jeremy Shapiro, “How to Measure the War,” Policy Review 157 (2009), 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/5490.  
29 Alejandro S. Hernandez, Julian Ouellet, and Christopher J. Nannini, “Circular Logic and Constant 
Progress: IW Assessments in Afghanistan,” in Assessing War: The Challenge of Measuring Success and 
Failure, ed. Leo J. Blanken, Hy Rothstein, and Jason J. Lepore (Washington, DC: Georgetown University 
Press, 2015), 222. 
30 Leo J. Blanken and Jason J. Lepore, "Principles, Agents, and Assessment," in Assessing War: The 
Challenge of Measuring Success and Failure, ed. Leo J. Blanken, Hy Rothstein, and Jason J. Lepore 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015), 8. 
31 Linda Robinson, “The SOF Experience in the Philippines and the Implications for Future Defense 
Strategy,” PRISM 6, no. 3 (2016): 151. 
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forces as advisors and trainers, and typically include direct support to combat operations 
conducted by the partner nation in the form of intelligence and logistics support. U.S. 
military doctrine refers to this support as foreign internal defense (FID), defined as 
“participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action 
programs taken by another government…to free and protect its society from subversion, 
lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security.”32 In most FID 
operations, foreign forces do not participate in combat operations directly but support the 
efforts of their host through a variety of security cooperation (SC) tools.33  
Existing literature includes a number of studies that describe or recommend an 
assessment framework for components of FID. These studies recommend frameworks for 
improving the management and assessment of security cooperation and capacity-building 
activities. Their recommendations largely deal with these functions at the operational and 
sometimes strategic level to identify how SC and capacity-building programs achieve 
theater campaign plan and theater security cooperation plan objectives.34 Others deal 
exclusively with the organizational structure necessary within the DOD to create a 
comprehensive approach to security cooperation, recommending the creation of a 
permanent force structure within the U.S. military (other than special operations forces) 
that is dedicated to the conduct of FID and other SC missions.35 
                                                 
32 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Foreign Internal Defense, JP 3-22 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010) ix. 
33 Robinson, “The SOF Experience,” 152. 
34 Ross Meyer, “SOF Regional Engagement: An Analysis of the Effectiveness of Current Attempts to 
Shape Future Battlefields,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2003) 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/950; Christopher Paul, Brian Gordon, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Lisa Saum-
Manning, Beth Grill, Colin P. Clarke, and Heather Peterson, A Building Partner Capacity Assessment 
Framework: Tracking Inputs, Outputs, Outcomes, Disrupters, and Workarounds (Santa Monica: RAND, 
2015). 
35 Theresa Baginski et al., A Comprehensive Approach to Improving U.S. Security Force Assistance 
Efforts (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009); Scott G. Wuestner, 
Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance: A New Structural Paradigm (Strategic Studies 
Institute, 2009), 58–59. In 2017 the Army formally created that new force structure by standing-up the 1st 
Security Force Assistance Brigade. 
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There have also been several studies that describe and recommend an assessment 
framework for a specific component of security cooperation or special warfare.36 An 
example of this work is the thesis of Leuthner and Cabahug that prescribes a framework 
for evaluating Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) events. Their analysis is 
telling, because it highlights the total absence of effective measurements for these special 
warfare components: “From the time of the JCET program’s inception, there is no 
evidence that a deliberate effort has been attempted to evaluate JCET effectiveness. … 
No evidence yet has been marshaled to support the claim that an executed JCET was 
successful based on any measure of objective analysis.”37 The framework they 
recommend is output-based, measuring the performance of the training itself and the 
specific goals of the authority, in this case that both the U.S. and partner unit receive 
appropriate and useful training benefit, that participants are properly vetted, and that the 
training is institutionalized by the partner nation.38 These measures are important, but 
they do not address the larger goals that a JCET is being used to achieve.  
Within the context of an indirect approach, special warfare campaign, an 
individual JCET represents a component of a patchwork of training, exercises, and 
authorities that are stitched together by the Theater Special Operations Command 
(TSOC) or a special operations task force to create a campaign narrative.39 Regional 
exercises often serve as a type of culmination event for partner forces being advised by 
                                                 
36 Scott D. Leuthner and Emmanuel Cabahug, “Joint Combined Exchange Training Evaluation 
Framework: A Crucial Tool in Security Cooperation Assessment,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2015) http://hdl.handle.net/10945/47809; and Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Counterterrorism: 
DOD Should Enhance Management of and Reporting on Its Global Train and Equip Program, GAO-16-
368 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office 2016). 
37 Leuthner and Cabahug, “Joint Combined Exchange Training Evaluation Framework,” 55. 
38 For an articulation of this official purpose, see Examining DOD Security Cooperation: When It 
Works and When It Doesn’t: Testimony Before the Armed Services Committee, House of Representatives, 
114th Congress (2015) (statement of Douglas Fraser, General, USAF (Retired) Former Commander, United 
States Southern Command), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20151021/104083/HHRG-114-
AS00-Wstate-FraserUSAFRetD-20151021.pdf. 
39 Examining DOD Security Cooperation: When it Works and When It Doesn’t: Testimony Before the 
Armed Services Committee, House of Representatives, 114th Congress (2015) (statement of Christopher 
Paul, RAND Office of External Affairs), 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20151021/104083/HHRG-114-AS00-Wstate-PaulC-
20151021.pdf. For an example of a SOF-centric indirect approach see David P. Fridovich and Fred T. 
Krawchuk, “The Special Operations Forces Indirect Approach: Winning in the Pacific,” Joint Forces 
Quarterly 44, (2007): 24-27. 
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U.S. SOF under different authorities, and these exercises themselves are designed to have 
their own specific impact on extremist groups.40 The most notable examples of this type 
of campaign are the efforts of SOF to support Philippine security forces against 
transnational terrorist groups in the region of Mindanao and a similar effort in Columbia 
to assist the Columbian armed forces in their fight against the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Columbia (FARC).41 SOF took a lead role in both of these FID 
missions, but they included support from a variety of military and civilian government 
entities and non-governmental organizations, all operating based on their individual 
legislated authorities and mandates.42 Therefore, an understanding of the implicit 
legislated goals of each component is important, but they do not address the ultimate 
objectives of the campaign (like countering a violent extremist organization or 
insurgency) once they are stitched together. 
1. Assessment Practice for Capacity Building in Africa 
For special warfare efforts on the African continent, many, if not all, of the above 
conditions and factors are involved in the difficulty of producing consistent and useful 
assessments of the social impacts of capacity building and other engagement. The official 
assessment effort focuses almost completely on partner force assessments, with the 
theoretical goal of an eventual transition once the unit has reached a designated level of 
proficiency.43 But assignment of responsibility for the conduct of these assessments 
makes them unreliable. Generally, individual teams and companies are held responsible 
for assessing their own performance during a deployment, typically covering a 5 to 9-
month period. Predictably, these assessments present almost universal success, are highly 
subjective, and lean heavily on measures of performance. The generally weak 
performance of African partner units, and a tendency to rotate forces out of these units 
                                                 
40 Author discussion with former commander of the Joint Special Operations Task Force – Trans 
Sahel (JSOTF-TS), July 27, 2017. 
41 For a more detailed examination of the campaign in the Philippines, see Fridovich and Krawchuk, 
“The Special Operations Forces Indirect Approach;” for Columbia, see Mark Moyar, Hector Pagan, and 
Wil R. Griego, Persistent Engagement in Columbia, (Tampa: JSOU Press, 2014). 
42 Robinson, “SOF Experience,” 152. 
43 Author discussion with SOCAFRICA staff member, 25 July 2017. 
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after they receive U.S. training and equipment, creates a perpetual cycle within the 
capacity building effort.44 Constant turn-over of forces creates a patchwork of assessment 
formats and no long-term connectivity between them.  
Policy documents that guide operations, like the civil-military engagement (CME) 
program that provides authority and funding for Civil Affairs teams deployed on the 
continent, support this structure by only requiring assessments from rotating teams. The 
result is years of work with no unifying narrative that connects unit actions with specific 
outcomes or changes in the environment, and a heavy reliance on anecdotal evidence of 
effect. These stories, which were repeated by several current and former practitioners I 
talked with, are generally similar to the one included at the beginning of this thesis, and 
describe a successful partner unit action that was enabled by popular support. These 
anecdotes are quite useful and persuasive (great for thesis introductions) and should not 
be discounted. They should, however, be married with more substantive information that 
attempts to connect U.S. advice and assistance to the observed effect through a causal 
pathway, thus creating a more complete assessment and a mechanism to learn and adapt 
when the effect is different than expected. 
B. IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE GOVERNANCE, DEVELOPMENT, 
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT SECTORS 
If the current options available in DOD doctrine and assessment practice are 
insufficient, it is useful to look at other disciplines for alternative methods. In the public 
sector outside of defense, the trend in performance measurement has shifted in the last 
several decades from aggregated, jurisdiction-wide data collection and presentation, to a 
more nuanced study of the results, or outcomes, of specific services or programs.45 The 
spheres of development, public diplomacy, community policing, and others have begun 
to apply the concept of impact assessment to the complex problems they face in order to 
better understand the linkages between action and impact, program and outcome. These 
                                                 
44 Lesley A. Warner, The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership: Building Partner Capacity to 
Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism (Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation, 2014), 74-76. 
45 Hatry, “Performance Measurement,” 4. 
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studies are being done even in conflict environments, making a strong case for potential 
utility for measuring indirect special warfare efforts.46 
The design and implementation of these studies have two distinct characteristics. 
First, the programs they assess are generally designed based on a theory of change or 
another form of logic model that aids in both the development of relevant interventions 
and the assessment methodology to evaluate them.47 According to Paul, “The theory of 
change for an activity, line of effort, or operation is the underlying logic for how planners 
think elements of the overall activity, line of effort, or operation will lead to desired 
results. Simply put, a theory of change is a statement of how you believe the things you 
are doing are going to lead to the objectives you seek.”48 The process of developing a 
logic model illuminates the assumptions that are inherent in the process—typically links 
between cause and effect.49 These assumptions become hypotheses that can be tested 
through assessment.  
Second, these social science-based studies generally incorporate an experimental 
or quasi experimental design. Both of these formats test causal hypotheses where the 
action or intervention is viewed as a treatment that is tested based on the measurement of 
pre-determined indicators.50 Such studies are structured to include both a treatment 
group, which is exposed to the activity or intervention, and a control group (also called a 
comparison group), which is not. Inferences are made about program impact based on 
                                                 
46 Marie Gaarder and Jeannie Annan, Impact Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding 
Interventions, Policy Research Working Paper No. 6469 (New York: World Bank Independent Evaluation 
Group, 2013); Christopher Blattman and Jeannie Annan, “Can Employment Reduce Lawlessness and 
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110, no. 1 (2016): 1-17. 
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Articulating a Theory of Change," Small Wars Journal 9, no. 7 (2013): 1-7; Jane Reisman and Anne 
Gienapp, "Theory of Change: A Practical Tool for Action, Results and Learning" prepared for the Annie E. 
Casey Foundation by Organizational Research Services, 2004; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, A 
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comparisons of pre- and post-test measurements. The difference between the two 
categories is that in experimental designs, the members of the treatment and control 
groups are chosen randomly. In quasi-experimental designs, the membership in these 
groups is either selected by the administrator or members are self-selected based on need 
or location. The control group is selected so that it is as similar as possible to the 
treatment group so that their comparison identifies the counterfactual—what would have 
been the outcome if the program or intervention had not been implemented.51 Table 1 
identifies the categories of assessment and evaluation used by other disciplines and 
compares their characteristics to those used within the DOD. There is no equivalent to 
impact assessment within the defense assessment doctrine. 




                                                 
51 White and Sabarwal, “Quasi-Experimental Design and Methods,” 1. 
52 Adapted from USAID Evaluation Policy, 2011 and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, JP 3-0 
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017). 
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1. Evaluating Countering Violent Extremism Effects 
The development community has successfully applied impact assessment for 
CVE programs in ways that may transfer to population-centric approaches in foreign 
internal defense.53 According to the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) policy on impact evaluation, any new untested development approach must be 
evaluated before it can be expanded in scale or scope.54 USAID frequently assesses its 
programs using studies based on a theory of change linking the interventions to specific 
outcomes and implements quasi-experimental designs to study those linkages.55 The 
results of these assessments are used to adjust programming—focusing on those 
interventions that are assessed to be working as designed, and rethinking theory or 
program design where they are not.  
The USAID evaluation policy document lays out a number of reasons why 
rigorous methods are used. Chief among the justifications are the program adjustment 
mentioned above and the necessity to provide adequate accountability for the public 
resources expended on these programs. At the time of the policy’s release, there had been 
a sharp decrease in substantive evaluations of the agency’s development programs and an 
increase in public skepticism regarding their utility or effectiveness.56 It is not 
unreasonable to think that a similar skepticism could grow surrounding the real impact of 
the defense department’s indirect approach to low intensity conflict. Demonstrating that 
impact through sound assessment would limit the threat from those critics.57 
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In practice, USAID has found that for governance and CVE programming, impact 
evaluation can be an effective tool for gaining insight into how specific program 
components are contributing to the ultimate objective. In West Africa, where the agency 
has a number of large CVE programs in place, they found that impact evaluation is most 
useful when it is conducted intentionally on a narrow range of activities or on a single 
program type. Compared to conducting an evaluation of an entire project, which could 
have a budget of tens of millions of dollars and span multiple countries, a small 
assessment can incorporate more rigorous controls and ultimately produce a result that 
provides greater confidence in the implementation of that component in the larger 
program.58 Currently, USAID’s West Africa mission is designing a study that looks 
specifically at a type of CVE radio program used to amplify moderate voices. The 
assessment will include randomized assignment to treatment and include a control group 
that is not exposed to the radio programming. This will allow the agency to understand 
the specific impact of those programs on extremist sentiment. Although that result is only 
truly valid for the specific sample and specific context, the result will either provide 
greater confidence in the broader effect, or, if the impact is different than expected, the 
impetus to make changes to content or delivery. 
The impact assessment being developed in West Africa is one of a number of 
similar evaluations supported by the agency’s Center of Excellence on Democracy, 
Human Rights and Governance at their headquarters in Washington.59 That organization 
created a learning agenda of 12 primary research questions and sponsors impact 
evaluation with both funding and academic expertise.60 The Center’s research question 
about accountability between local government and civil society organizations motivated 
an impact assessment of a training program for traditional leaders in Zimbabwe. The goal 
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of the program was to reduce violent extremism at the community level, but the specific 
links between program activities and violence were not well understood. With the 
institutional and funding assistance from Washington, the team designed a randomized 
control trial using two different training procedures and a control group that did not 
receive any training. The results showed that the training variant where traditional leaders 
were trained alongside community leaders was more effective at improving governance 
indicators. However, the study also found that this arrangement increased social tension 
and the incidence of political intimidation—an unexpected negative consequence.61 The 
information provided by the impact assessment allows policy-makers and program 
managers to make informed decisions—looking at both the positive and negative impacts 
to determine whether the benefits outweigh the risks. This productive relationship, for the 
purposes of evaluation expertise, reach back, and funding, between the operational units 
in the field and the institutional component in D.C. is one that could be applied to the 
special warfare community.  
2. Impact Assessment and Law Enforcement Strategy 
In his book, The Tipping Point, Gladwell examines the crime epidemic in New 
York City in the 1980s, looking specifically at crime on the subway system as 
representative of that epidemic, and identifying the actions that led, in part, to its end in 
the 1990s.62 He gives credit for the dramatic drop in crime to the implementation of a 
policing strategy known as the “broken windows” approach, first proposed by Kelling 
and Wilson in a highly influential 1982 article in the Atlantic Monthly.63 In the New York 
subway system, that strategy involved a number of seemingly minor environmental 
changes, like the complete removal of all graffiti from the subway cars and the strict 
enforcement of fare-beating. Gladwell argues that these minor conditions, when 
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aggregated and unchecked, created a very powerful descriptive norm that had an 
escalatory effect; according to the police commissioner, “the graffiti was symbolic of the 
collapse of the system.”64 According to proponents of the approach, the dramatic effort to 
remove it and end fare-beating changed the environmental context and had a dampening 
effect on the entire range of criminal activity. This style of policing disorder was then 
adopted by many police forces across the country because of its reported success in 
ending the crime epidemic in New York. 
The apparent effect of the broken windows approach has useful corollaries to the 
environmental context of irregular conflict that I explore later in the thesis, but for now, 
the example provides the opportunity to demonstrate the utility of impact assessment to 
improve understanding of cause and effect. This is true for two reasons: first, the study of 
law enforcement is a close a parallel to insurgency and irregular warfare, requiring both 
coercive and persuasive mechanisms to overcome disorder and violence. Second, much 
like COIN and IW, policing is often hyper-localized, where methods should be dictated 
by the social and political context. Despite the need for localized approaches, strategies in 
both fields are often applied blindly based on apparent success elsewhere. The rapid 
spread of broken windows policing strategies despite limited empirical evidence of their 
effectiveness is a good example of this phenomenon.  
Gladwell’s description of the rapid drop in violent crime in New York is 
convincing, but his anecdotal evidence is nothing more than an interesting correlation 
unless it is subjected to a more rigorous assessment. Partly on account of the difficulty of 
assessing causality, the debate about this type of policing has become highly polarized, 
and critiques of the strategy are many.65 Opponents argue that these policies do not 
address the social and structural root causes of crime and disproportionately target 
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minorities and the disenfranchised.66 Moreover, the strategy has spawned a whole host of 
approaches that seem far removed from the original concept: a hyper-focus on 
misdemeanor arrests, random “stop and frisk” tactics, and aggressive “zero tolerance” 
policing that breeds distrust between communities and police forces and actually appears 
to make things more difficult for the police.67 Relying mostly on observational data, 
studies have shown that there is no evidence of a link between the misdemeanor arrests 
that are associated with a broken windows strategy and a decline in serious felony 
crime.68 
On the other side of the debate, police officers who are convinced of the 
effectiveness of the broken windows approach will often structure their responses to these 
critics from a position of experiential authority, claiming, for example, that “police don’t 
have time for these virtual-reality theories; they do their work in the real world.”69 This 
kind of response is unproductive and undermines, rather than supports, the credibility of 
those who are honestly trying to understand what policies will actually prevent violent 
crime and disorder. Proponents have also published studies to support their claims about 
effectiveness, but these studies have difficulty assigning causality because of their 
reliance on observational crime and policing data.70  
A more useful and reliable means of understanding the impact of these methods is 
being pursued by criminologists Anthony Braga and Brenda Bond, who summarized the 
issue this way:  
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Given the widespread popularity of broken windows policing, 
considerable need exists to conduct additional rigorous evaluations of its 
crime-control effectiveness and to develop some much needed empirical 
evidence on the key elements of the approach that generate observable 
preventive benefits.71  
Their study did exactly that. They created an experimental design and applied broken 
windows-style policing strategies to randomly selected treatment locations and compared 
the change in crime and disorder calls for service with control locations where no change 
in policing strategy occurred. The results of the impact evaluation showed a dramatic 
improvement in outcome, and comparison of the various component strategies indicated 
that “the strongest crime prevention gains were generated by situational prevention 
strategies rather than by misdemeanor arrests or social service strategies.”72 Their 
experimental research design and rigorous methodology make their causal claims quite 
strong. Based upon their results, they recommend a problem-oriented policing strategy 
and a co-design process that incorporates local input, rather than a hyper-focus on 
misdemeanor arrests. 
This example of experimental evaluation of policing strategy is a useful 
illustration for the measurement of results in special warfare campaigns. Much like the 
policing example, the impacts of capacity building activities are often highly subjective, 
and accurate reporting about impact can quickly fall victim to bureaucratic politics and 
entrenched ideas about cause and effect. For this reason, it is critical that practitioners, 
who are rightly convinced of the utility of their methods, refrain from ad hominem 
attacks on their critics, and instead adopt an approach similar to that of Braga and 
Bond.73 You could replace the activity and the outcome in the quote from the previous 
paragraph, and it would be thoroughly accurate: since building partner capacity is a 
popular component of irregular warfare campaigns, “significant need exists to conduct 
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additional rigorous evaluations” of its effectiveness in countering VEO, “to develop some 
much needed empirical evidence on the key elements of the approach that generate 
observable preventive benefits.”74 All available means should be used to draw specific 
causal links between those observable impacts and the specific interventions and actions. 
Studies like the Zimbabwe impact evaluation and the policing study demonstrate that 
randomized experimental design is possible even in areas where it was thought to be 
difficult or impossible. In the Zimbabwe study, randomization was achieved by phasing 
implementation into two years and randomly assigning villages that would receive the 
training in the first year. Before and after measurement was bracketed around the first 
year of implementation, creating a natural control group from those villages that were 
slated to receive the training in the second year.  
Even when randomized experimental assessment design in the context of a special 
warfare campaign is unrealistic, quasi-experimental designs, when combined with 
modern statistical methods, can simulate the randomized assignment into treatment and 
control and improve understanding of cause and effect. Lyall, Blair, and Imai 
demonstrate this possibility with a survey experiment that studies the effects of violence 
on popular support for ISAF and the Taliban in Afghanistan.75 Rather than asking 
respondents directly about their attitudes toward the combatants, they use an endorsement 
experiment to elicit those attitudes indirectly. Violence (treatment) cannot be controlled 
by these researchers and is decidedly non-random. So they use a natural experiment 
structure and matching to approximate that level of control.76 If the military applied these 
methods to its own assessments, it would have the additional benefit of a very nuanced 
understanding of when and why it acted within the environment, increasing the strength 
of the resulting findings. 
To that end, a team of analysts and authors at the RAND corporation have 
published a series of papers, articles, and monographs that strive to bridge the gap 
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between the rigorous, quasi-experimental assessments being employed by the 
development and civil sectors, and the struggles of the DOD to find adequate methods for 
assessing complex conflict environments.77 The most significant of these publications is 
a comprehensive study that applies the lessons and techniques of academic evaluation of 
public communication and public diplomacy to defense-sector efforts designed to inform, 
influence, and persuade. Its prescriptions include the use of logic models and the 
application of social science experimental design to demonstrate cause and effect.78 
While specifically targeting evaluation of information operations and military 
information support operations, their recommendations have broad utility for evaluating 
indirect counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, and civil-military operations, where 
campaign success is largely dictated by relationships of trust and legitimacy. This thesis 
validates that utility through the use of a special warfare impact assessment 
demonstration. 
Prior to conducting that demonstration, the following chapter will introduce the 
theory of change concept and apply it to the special warfare operating environment. 
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III. ASSESSMENT CONTEXT: WHAT TO MEASURE AND WHY 
In a dusty, West African conference room in 2014, a handful of U.S. special 
operations advisors described the situation in Niger as “a war taking place in ungoverned 
spaces… where the Westphalian state can’t project power.”79 They described their role in 
that war as supporting the reinforcement of the foundations of society: governance, 
development, and security. Their interlocutor, New York Times columnist Eliza Griswold, 
calls the concept of ungoverned spaces a “shibboleth,” an in-group identifier whose real 
meaning is irrelevant for members of the counterterrorism community. In doing so, she 
casts doubt on the term’s validity in describing the political context that leads to 
insurgency and extremism.80 But for special warfare practitioners, the concept of 
ungoverned or under-governed space retains its relevance because it describes the 
absence of the vital components of the state, a gap that allows sovereignty to be 
questioned and ultimately challenged—a phenomenon that is becoming more prevalent as 
civil wars and violent non-state challengers proliferate across the globe.81  
This thesis explores the utility of impact assessment as a means to better 
understand how improved capacity within that context affects the relationship between a 
military force and the civilian populations it is charged with protecting. In order to do so, 
it is important to first take a step back to examine the context where capacity building 
occurs, identify some theory that can serve as a framework for how that new capacity 
impacts the environment, and develop a logic model, also called a theory of change, to 
describe the path from action to effect and guide assessment of impact. This chapter 
combines existing research, the unclassified foundational documents from special 
operations forces, and discussions with current and former practitioners to develop these 
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components—providing the necessary theoretical and philosophical foundation for the 
demonstration of impact assessment methods. 
I will start by exploring the idea of ungoverned space, which the practitioners 
interviewed in Niger identify as a key concept that shapes their understanding of the 
operating environment. An understanding of the critical functions of the state and its 
ability to project them into under-governed areas will aid in the development of an 
assessment strategy for those that are supporting states in the struggle against insurgent, 
extremist, or other internal threats.  
A. THE SOVEREIGNTY GAP: COMPETING FOR CONTROL 
Ghani, Lockhart, and Carnahan describe the issue of state control in terms of a 
“sovereignty gap” between the legal recognition of a state and its de facto ability to 
exercise that sovereignty within its borders.82 They propose a set of primary functions 
that a state should perform within its territory as a type of sovereignty metric. The list is 
headed by a legitimate monopoly on violence and also includes a number of legal, 
administrative, economic, and social responsibilities that, when performed in an 
integrated way, create a powerful reinforcing effect that builds trust in the system as a 
whole.83  
These arguments support the need for a focus on areas of contested sovereignty, 
but doing so in a way that reinforces the sovereignty of the state rather than undermining 
it. Meierhenrich offers a similar perspective by emphasizing that the authority of states 
rests in their functional utility and the confidence that it creates in individuals and 
groups.84 Meierhenrich identifies six primary functions of what he calls a “usable” state. 
In addition to concrete concepts like security and resource control, his list includes more 
abstract ideas such as “displaying resolve” and “lending credibility.”85 Although these 
concepts might seem unclear, ultimately it is a combination of both real and 
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psychological factors that would lead an individual or group to support an alternative to 
the state, so these ideas must be part of the equation. States must have the capability to 
project security, administrative, and economic functions within their borders and create 
the perception of confidence, predictability, and credibility that ultimately ensures the 
loyalty of people and groups that are inherently self-interested. Due to these cognitive 
factors, a state must leverage localized sources of influence and political representation in 
order to consolidate power in areas of contested sovereignty. The capability to develop, 
encourage, and ultimately influence populations through civil society organizations is an 
important component of the “usable” state, particularly when its capability to provide 
essential services and economic incentives is limited. 
The concept of sovereignty and consolidation of state power has been particularly 
challenging in post-colonial settings. In his book, States and Power in Africa, Herbst 
identifies a historical precedent in Sub-Saharan Africa and other post-colonial settings 
with low population density, whereby states have developed a strategy of gaining control 
over core urban or economic zones and then governing peripheral areas based on the 
availability of resources and security forces to do so.86 This strategy inherently leaves 
much of the land-mass in an ungoverned or under-governed status based on a calculation 
of costs and benefits to the state. In this way, in many post-colonial settings but 
particularly in Africa, “power still radiates outward from the core political areas and 
tends to diminish over distance.”87 Despite the apparent fragility of this construct, 
borders remained fairly static during the first decades of the post-colonial period, and 
conflict centered on political control of the urban core. 
However, the rising tide of state failure and the increasing prominence of 
successful violent non-state groups demonstrates that the old paradigm is no longer 
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functioning.88 Herbst identifies a shift that occurred in the 1980s, where post-colonial 
African states began to be threatened by rural-based insurgencies. The first of these was 
led by Museveni in Uganda, who drew upon Maoist principles to build a base of support 
in the hinterland. As a result, these states can no longer count on the assumption of de 
facto control of the area within their established territorial boundaries.89 The steady rise 
of the threat of state-sponsored insurgencies and non-state groups demands a shift away 
from the traditional notions of security against external threats and a renewed emphasis 
on areas that were previously left alone due to the high relative cost of their integration.  
Kilcullen describes this competitive internal environment and identifies a 
changing irregular warfare context that is characterized by the growth of massive urban 
sprawl—at a scale that is quickly outpacing the capability of states to maintain control.90 
While his analysis of the changing conflict environment and the characteristics of what 
might be called ungoverned space is important, it is Kilcullen’s portrayal of the 
competition among groups within that space that is most relevant to this thesis, 
challenging the traditional understanding of power dynamics within irregular war. His 
theory of competitive control, based on the writing of Fall and Kalyvas, states that “in 
irregular conflicts…, the local armed actor that a given population perceives as best able 
to establish a predictable, consistent, and wide-spectrum normative system of control is 
most likely to dominate that population and its residential areas.”91 This theory applies to 
                                                 
88 A recent United Nations report identified a three-fold increase in major civil wars in the last decade, 
many of which have become internationalized, protracted, and complicated by the presence of jihadist 
groups; Sebastian von Einsiedel et al., Civil War Trends and the Changing Nature of Armed Conflict 
(occasional paper 10, United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, 2017), 
https://cpr.unu.edu/civil-war-trends-and-the-changing-nature-of-armed-conflict.html. 
89 Herbst, States and Power, 254. 
90 David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerilla (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). Exploration of the implications of this changing environment is beyond the scope 
of this thesis, but Kilcullen’s analysis challenges the traditional notions of ungoverned space as a rural 
phenomenon and describes the growth of a new type of urban hinterland. In these ungoverned spaces, non-
state groups, empowered by a vastly increased level of local and transnational connectivity, will compete 
with the state for control. The implication is that although the default for practitioners is to look for 
ungoverned spaces in remote areas, these spaces will increasingly be found in the midst of core political 
zones, surrounded by areas where power is fully consolidated. This may greatly impact the functions of the 
state that are most critical for expansion of control. 
91 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 126; Kilcullen references Bernard B. Fall, “The Theory and 
Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” Naval War College Review, Winter 1998 [1965]; and 
Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
 33 
a wide range of non-state elements, from drug cartels to Islamic extremist groups, all 
competing against the state or simply filling-in where the state has ceded control. Each 
actor that is competing for control of an area where state sovereignty is in question will 
create some form of normative system, and whichever group or government does this 
most effectively is likely to gain de facto control of that space.  
In the context of this discussion on consolidation of state control in contested 
areas, the role of the state must be to outcompete its rivals “across the full coercion-
persuasion spectrum, allowing it to establish an uncontested normative system over a 
given population or territory.”92 In reality, this looks much like the usable state concept 
presented earlier. These competitive systems must have components that are attractive to 
the affected population, like conflict resolution mechanisms and the provision of services 
that are seen as essential in the given context. More importantly in contested areas prone 
to conflict, however, are the more coercive and persuasive mechanisms that create a 
sense of security and predictability when the population follows the rules established by 
the dominant actor.93 
B. CREATING COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: INFLUENCING 
NORMATIVE CONTEXT AND BEHAVIOR  
The concept of ungoverned or under-governed spaces certainly has value to the 
special warfare practitioner supporting a partner nation and seeking to develop a 
framework to assess that support. However, it is critical that foreigners who are wading 
into these spaces acknowledge that they may not be seeing the whole picture—that in the 
absence of visible state presence, some alternative normative system has likely developed 
in its place.94 If the goal of a capacity building effort is to build and support the 
components of a normative system that can outcompete potential rivals, alternatives, or 
adversary regimes, what should be the focus of the state and its external sponsors? To 
answer that question, I argue that there are two primary ingredients for the creation of 
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competitive advantage: first, the development of effective institutions and systems in the 
primary areas of concern, and second, the use of influencing activities and engagements 
to “bootstrap” the advantage created by those institutions and systems.95 The focus of the 
state and its external sponsors should be on the development of institutions and processes 
that create a sense of security and predictability for affected populations. The emphasis 
should be placed on the creation of effective security forces that develop strong 
relationships of mutual trust with civilian populations and support the essential 
bureaucratic and judicial components for the specific economic and social context—all of 
these engaging with existing civil society and social structures.  
In order to succeed in this effort and build competitive advantage, states and their 
external sponsors must adopt what Grynkewich calls a “strategy of displacement.”96 His 
analysis primarily describes the specific scenarios in which a violent non-state group is 
providing social services, and the elimination of the group will result in the expansion of 
popular grievances now associated with those services. However, his formulation could 
be expanded to include the various normative elements of social control, both coercive 
and persuasive, to include the critical functions of security and justice. It is not sufficient 
to simply build a suitable security force and eliminate the security threat posed by an 
adversary group through direct targeting or isolation from the population. Instead, the 
state must displace the coercive and persuasive functions that allowed the group to gain 
de facto control or that were creating a stream of recruits and material support. 
Apart from the demonstrable construction of responsive and accountable 
institutions, influence activities can be used to overcome environmental and social 
obstacles that give non-state competitors an inherent advantage. Cragin and Gerwehr 
define influence activities as those that “attempt to influence the perceptions, cognitions, 
and behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.”97 
Although their study focuses on influence campaigns at the strategic level, the spectrum 
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of psychological objectives that they describe is applicable at the operational and tactical 
levels that are the focus of this thesis. Although there is an inclination to associate 
influence with psychological operations (now called military information support 
operations, or MISO), that tendency is misplaced—any time foreigners show up to 
partner with a host nation force, they are engaged in an activity that will have an 
influencing effect, whether they intend to or not.  
The influence spectrum described by Cragin and Gerwehr is a range of potential 
effects defined by three primary categories: compliance, conformity, and conversion.98 
The objectives of compliance and conformity are likely to be the primary focus for 
influence activities in the context of irregular warfare. They align well with the coercive 
and persuasive components of competitive control: the coercive mechanisms of control 
result in popular compliance based on demonstrated punitive impacts of defiance, while 
the persuasive elements change the context so that the desired behavior or allegiance is 
advantageous to the individual.  
This form of persuasive influence is explored by Goldstein and Cialdini, who 
describe social norms and their influence on human behavior. They describe “the focus 
theory of normative conduct” as a way to better understand how and when social norms 
will affect behavior.99 Focus theory has two central components. The first is the need to 
separate the two different types of behavioral norms and their distinct effects on 
behavior: descriptive norms identify things that people are doing, while injunctive norms 
identify what people ought to do. The second component of focus theory is that a 
particular norm only has traction for changing behavior to the extent that it is readily 
available consciously. The authors argue that in order to change behavior, an audience 
must be convinced or reminded that a certain behavior is normative—that it is the default 
mode for the group and the right thing to do—and make that information salient or 
readily available when a decision to act is made.100 This suggests that the most powerful 
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way to influence individual behavior is to impact the social or communal norms. For 
example, for individuals who identify strongly with a particular group, or generally in 
societies where identity is constructed primarily based upon group membership, emphasis 
on group norms will result in greater adherence to the normative behavior.101 If a 
particular society is organized around traditional, familial, or ethnic ties, and positive 
norms relating to security forces can be identified, then drawing attention to these 
behaviors could have positive impacts on individuals that are inclined to deviate from 
that norm. 
The dramatic changes made by the New York subway system and police force in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, described earlier during the discussion on assessment of 
law enforcement strategy, demonstrates the link between normative context and 
individual and group behavior. Gladwell validates the power of descriptive norms—what 
he refers to as “the Power of Context”—in determining the behavior of individuals and 
groups.102 The example shows that for military forces building the capacity of partners 
fighting irregular conflicts, there should be an emphasis on changing the normative 
behaviors of their partner forces towards the populations with whom they interact, and 
vice versa. Advisors should look at communities that are identified as at-risk and identify 
the normative response to security forces and how those forces behave vis-à-vis the 
population, its key leadership, and other influential actors or groups. If these interactions 
are counterproductive, adversarial, or even just apathetic, the focus of the influence 
campaign and advisory effort should be on reversing that trend. Additionally, the 
demonstrated power of descriptive norms should motivate practitioners to seek out 
interventions that acknowledge or leverage their effect. An example of this type of 
thinking can be seen in a series of recent U.S. government-funded efforts in Niger and 
Nigeria, where small grants funded brush clearing around villages and roads in areas 
                                                 
101 Goldstein and Cialdini, “Using Social Norms,” 170. 
102 Gladwell, Tipping Point, 142. 
 37 
threatened by Boko Haram.103 Like the graffiti on the subway, the overgrown brush 
creates a tunnel effect—a descriptive norm that creates the context of insecurity, whether 
or not these areas are actually being used by the extremists for concealment. Changing 
that descriptive norm could have influential effects and actually change the attitudes and 
behavior of the population in that area. If these are included in a theory of change, their 
impact can then be tested through evaluation. 
As part of the process of assessing operations designed to influence a particular 
population, practitioners must be aware of the potential for behavioral and descriptive 
norms to play a spoiling role in those operations. The same awareness will lead to 
opportunities to identify and leverage normative behavior that can positively impact the 
link between actions and desired effect. The discussions on logical pathways and the 
demonstration of impact assessment methods in the next section and chapter add greater 
weight to these connections. 
C. A THEORY OF CHANGE FOR CIVIL-ENGAGEMENT CAPACITY 
BUILDING 
The analysis in the previous sections identified the sociopolitical and 
environmental context for special warfare campaigns against violent non-state groups. In 
order to demonstrate the utility of the impact assessment method in that context, I will 
first identify the specific logical pathway, or theory of change, that will be assessed. In 
this section, I propose a theory of change that outlines the logical connections from 
capacity building to the desired effect on populations vulnerable to VEO influence and 
recruitment. Those connections then form the basis for the impact assessment. The theory 
is based on the stated goals of SOCAFRICA engagement in the command’s unclassified 
foundational documents, discussions with current and former participants in these efforts, 
and the analysis conducted in the previous sections. The theory of change identifies how 
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capacity building activities might lead to the consolidation of control, and what should be 
measured to demonstrate progress.  
In current practice, U.S. forces often build their efforts around binary task-and-
purpose statements that do not adequately account for the complexity of the environment 
or the logical progression from a to b. For example, a component of non-lethal capacity 
building efforts might be oriented around a statement like the following: 
SOF forces build host nation civil-military engagement capacity [in order 
to] counter violent extremist organizations. 
This statement contains several assumptions that are hidden by the phrase “in 
order to,”—what Paul refers to as “a huge assumptive gap.”104 In his writing he 
demonstrates that taking this binary statement at face value suggests that you only need to 
measure the activity (capacity building) and the outcome (VEO strength).105 This flaw 
aligns with the existing DOD framework, which calls for measuring performance 
(activities) and measuring effect (observed change). But what if capacity is built and 
there is no apparent change in the VEO’s level of influence? This seems to be the 
situation in many places were special operations forces are building partner capacity. 
Fortunately, just like social interventions of all kinds, any action taken by a military force 
to affect a change within a complex human environment is based on some theoretical 
understanding about how that action will lead to the desired effect, whether or not that 
theory is stated explicitly.106 So it is possible to expand the task and purpose statement 
into a clearly articulated theory of change that identifies the appropriate inputs, outputs, 
and outcomes to measure and also enables the identification of assumptions to test.107 A 
basic theory of change for this example could be laid out as follows.  
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IF we build partner security force capacity to conduct effective and targeted civil-
military operations AND this capability is employed in vulnerable areas, THEN these 
vulnerable populations will view their military as more effective, legitimate and capable 
AND support and information from these populations for the military force will be 
increased AND support for extremist organizations will be reduced AND VEO 
recruitment will be reduced THEN VEO strength and influence is degraded.108  
Essentially, two additional steps and more specific intermediate outcomes have 
been added to the task and purpose statement listed above to describe a logical 
connection between the capacity building and violent extremism. Some of these 
outcomes would take place simultaneously, so the visual depiction of this theory of 
change found in Figure 2 is useful in demonstrating this process logically. The 
progression shows how capacity building that is absorbed and applied in the right areas 
creates competitive advantage for the state and strengthens their position of normative 
control. This theory is consistent with Lansdale’s view of the effect of what he called 
“civic action,” which was designed to fundamentally change and strengthen the 
relationship between the people and the government, using the military as a conduit for 
this change.109  
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Figure 2.  Example theory of change for civil engagement capacity building 
It is important to note that any theory of change, including the one presented here, 
still includes a number of assumptions about the relationships between action and effect, 
and between the various steps in the model. In each particular case there are a multitude 
of factors that affect decisions about loyalty, support, or acquiescence.110 For example, 
we assume that a population that views their military as effective and capable will be 
more likely to provide overt support for that military in the form of information and 
recruits. Another step assumes there is a connection between an individual’s evaluation 
of military competence and governance competence generally. So, it is important to 
recognize that these are only assumptions, and should be tested through assessment in 
each specific context.  
In order to make the theory of change useful for that purpose, the identified 
assumptions are then converted into hypotheses for the purposes of evaluation. For the 
example presented here, I identified six hypotheses that could be tested: 
1. Positive and productive engagement by trained military forces in areas 
vulnerable to VEO influence will produce an increase in positive 
assessments of military forces as legitimate and capable. 
2. Positive assessments of military/police effectiveness are associated with 
lower levels of extremist sentiment or support. 
                                                 
110 Kalyvas explores the range of factors that include political, economic, social, and pragmatic 
justifications for joining or supporting government or insurgent forces: Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence, 95-
97. 
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3. Positive assessments of military/police effectiveness are associated with a 
positive view of legitimate governance institutions more broadly. 
4. An improved assessment of military capability and legitimacy will 
increase a person’s likelihood of actively or passively supporting the 
military (i.e., providing information about VEO activity). 
5. An improved assessment of military capacity and legitimacy will lower a 
person’s likelihood of actively or passively supporting a VEO. 
6. An improved assessment of military capability and legitimacy will 
decrease the likelihood of an individual joining or actively supporting a 
VEO.  
None of the statements listed here seem controversial, but a diligent operational 
approach requires practitioners to acknowledge the fact that they are, indeed, hypotheses, 
and then go about the business of testing them. The impact assessment demonstration 
presented in the next chapter will provide an example of how this could be carried out. 
The demonstration looks specifically at the first hypothesis—testing the connections 
between the first three “If…And…Then” statements in the theory of change.  
The theory of change presented here is not designed to be comprehensive, but 
merely as a constructive example for the purposes of the demonstration to follow. In fact, 
the analysis from the previous two sections of this chapter indicate that additional caveats 
might be necessary or useful to make this theory of change more accurate. For example, 
it might be necessary to add another “AND” statement in step two to acknowledge the 
influencing effect of descriptive norms. This might be stated this way: AND the context of 
insecurity is reduced. Also, it is clear from the previous analysis that military capacity 
must be responsive to specific contextual needs, indicating that an additional “AND” 
statement might be required. In this case, I include that as part of what would be 
considered “effective” in the existing model. If that kind of contextual need is ignored, it 
would certainly serve as a spoiler for other, seemingly productive, engagements. 
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It is also important to note that this theory of change is not limited to forces, like 
Civil Affairs, that specifically train, advise, and assist partner forces in civil engagement. 
Any partner force that interacts with or works alongside of these populations is included 
in the creation of potential impact. Partner nation counterterrorism forces often look and 
function like advanced infantry units and lean heavily on human intelligence and other 
forms of overt support from populations in areas where they are deployed for internal 
security and counterinsurgency missions. Their interactions with those populations can be 
critical to success and an important component of the competitive advantage equation. As 
such, the special operations forces advising them should be cognizant of that important 
relationship and their potential role in fostering it. 
Further research could expand this theory of change to incorporate a full 
exploration of its potential branches and spoilers. Some authors and organizations 
conceptualize theory of change as a process design tool that guides participants through 
the identification of a long-term goal and the incremental conditions necessary to achieve 
it.111 Those conditions then become desired outcomes that can be aligned with actions. 
Future research could adopt this approach and apply design thinking to conceptualize a 
complete theory of change for capacity building and influence operations to counter 
violent extremist groups in a specific context. 
As is stands, the theory of change articulated here is sufficient to demonstrate the 
utility of the method as the foundation for impact assessment. The hypotheses developed 
during the formulation of the theory of change guide the necessary measurement to test 
their individual validity and the cogency of the entire logical progression. The following 
chapter will demonstrate how a quasi-experimental impact assessment can be used 
effectively for that purpose. 
                                                 
111 Dana H. Taplin and Helene Clark, Theory of Change Basics: A Primer on Theory of Change (New 
York: ActKnowledge, 2012), 1.  
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IV. IMPACT ASSESSMENT DEMONSTRATION 
The theory of change developed in the previous chapter provides the necessary 
foundation to test the utility of impact assessment as a measurement tool for special 
warfare capacity-building activities. In this chapter, I demonstrate the application of 
quasi-experimental assessment design by testing a component of that theory of change in 
the context of ongoing special warfare activities. For that demonstration, I use real data 
from U.S. engagement in Niger, where U.S. SOF have been working for several years to 
strengthen the military’s capability to counter VEO. The demonstration uses an ex post 
facto, quasi-experimental design to assess the treatment effect of SOF engagement during 
Exercise Flintlock 2015. Specifically, the assessment studies the impact of Flintlock 
activities in light of the first and third hypotheses from the theory of change: positive and 
productive engagement by trained military forces in areas vulnerable to VEO influence 
will increase assessments of military forces and national government as legitimate and 
capable. 
The assessment follows the example of Lyall (2009 and 2010) by using a 
combination of both matching and difference-in-differences design to identify treatment 
effects.112 The assessment compares the change in institutional confidence among 
populations in areas that were exposed to SOF engagement (or its descendent effect) to 
those in areas that were not exposed to the treatment. In order to improve causal 
inference, I use matching to create treatment and control groups that are similar on a 
range of potentially disruptive covariates. The results of this study clearly demonstrate 
the utility of these methods by illuminating impacts that were not revealed in the original 
assessment and improving confidence in the connections between action and effect. Apart 
from demonstrating the viability of these methods within the context of special warfare, 
the substantive results of the assessment are valuable in their own right, because they 
indicate that additional components may be necessary within the theory of change 
                                                 
112 Jason Lyall, “Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no 3 (June 2009); and Jason Lyall, “Are Coethnics More Effective 
Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen War,” American Political Science Review 104, no. 
1 (2010). 
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proposed in Chapter III. The results provide evidence that descriptive norms are spoiling 
the anticipated effect of the capacity building event and preventing the desired 
improvement in the state’s competitive advantage.  
A. BACKGROUND—EXERCISE FLINTLOCK 2015  
Exercise Flintlock is an annual Joint Chiefs of Staff-sponsored multinational 
military exercise, with participants from both African and Western partner nations. The 
primary goals of the exercise are to foster regional cooperation, develop the 
counterterrorism capacity of African partner militaries, and counter VEO in North and 
West Africa.113 The event is planned and executed every year by SOCAFRICA and 
hosted on a rotational basis in one of several West African nations. In 2015, the exercise 
was hosted by Chad, with other training locations spread throughout the region. These 
other locations, including Niger, were essentially just small surges for existing FID 
missions. 
For the purposes of an impact assessment demonstration, the case provides 
several useful advantages. First, there is an existing assessment for the exercise based on 
before and after survey data, covering a two-month period that includes all exercise-
related events and other engagements that took place during that time. The existing 
assessment provides both available data and a useful comparison: by using the same data 
to draw much stronger conclusions, I am able to clearly demonstrate the utility of the 
methods. Second, as an initial application of these methods to a special warfare context, 
the surge of activity associated with the exercise and the relatively short period of time 
covered by the data provides greater confidence in the estimation of causal relationships. 
Third, the author was personally involved in the planning and execution of the exercise, 
and participated in civil-military engagements and other events that occurred in Chad. 
This personal experience provides additional clarity regarding the objectives and intent of 
the exercise. It also places the author in a position of personal culpability for any negative 
                                                 
113 Bardha Azari, “Flintlock ’15 Wraps up in N’Djamena, Chad,” United States Africa Command 
Media Room, March 09, 2015, https://www.africom.mil/media-room/article/25269/flintlock-15-wraps-up-
in-ndjamena-chad. 
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findings, hopefully making the study feel less like a critique and more like a constructive 
example of a potentially useful practice. 
B. ASSESSMENT COMPARISON AND IMPROVEMENT 
1. Original Data 
Contracted through the U.S. Special Operations Command’s Global Research and 
Assessment Program (GRAP), ORB International conducted both pre- and post-
intervention surveys (Wave 1 and Wave 2, respectively) in Niger, with the first survey in 
mid-February and the second in mid-April, 2015.114 ORB distributed the sample for both 
surveys equally among urban areas in the regions of Niamey, Diffa and Agadez, with a 
minimum of 450 interviews in each region. The total sample size included 1,368 
respondents in wave 1, and 1,371 respondents in wave 2. The surveys were conducted 
through face-to-face interviews by local interviewers familiar with the customs and 
language of the respondents.115 The purpose of the surveys was to assess knowledge of 
and impact of the Flintlock exercise, as well as media exposure, institutional confidence, 
extremism, and other social instability factors. The survey responses also include 
demographic information and the geospatial location of each interview. I used the R 
statistical program to process the original survey data, filter for non-responses, and create 
the indexes used as independent and dependent variables in this study.116 Additionally, I 
used R to create the geospatial elements and other visuals in this chapter. R has unique 
advantages over other statistical programs because it is completely open-source and can 
support a huge variety of statistical and geospatial analysis tasks. Appendix A has more 
specific information on the construction of the index variables in this study. 
                                                 
114 ORB International, Flintlock 2015 Survey – Niger Analytic Report, May 2015. 
115 ORB International, Flintlock 2015, 3. 
116 R Core Team, R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing, R Foundation for 
Statistical Computing, (Vienna, 2017), https://www.R-project.org/; Gary King, Christopher Lucas, and 
Richard Nielsen, “Matching Frontier: R Package for Computing the Matching Frontier,” R package version 
1.0.0, 2015. 
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2. Existing Assessment 
The existing assessment, based on the ORB surveys, consists of the original 
survey report and an additional product, created by DigitalGlobe, which combines the 
survey data with other geospatial information to create a polished report.117 
Unfortunately, the assessment largely misses the mark, focusing heavily on awareness of 
Flintlock, rather than the impact of its specific activities. The methods used in the 
assessment do not identify any impact that can be tied directly to the partnered training 
events and civil-military engagement that was taking place during the period between 
survey waves. The survey includes questions about Nigerien institutions, but direct 
impact on trust in those institutions is not assessed (or cannot be assessed using 
comparisons of descriptive statistics only). The following represents an example of the 
identification of a potential impact, weakened by the inability to assess causal inference 
(emphasis added by the author):  
Opinions of the U.S. government and military remained fairly static in all regions 
except Agadez where opinions of both institutions rose ten points post-Flintlock 
(U.S. government - 55% to 65%; U.S. military - 57% to 67%). While it’s difficult 
to account exactly for the positive increase in Agadez from the survey data alone, 
it is important to note that a Medical Assistance Activity (MEDSEM) as part of 
the Flintlock Exercise occurred in Agadez on February 26th.118 
This example shows the difficulty in assessing causality without the necessary 
experimental or quasi-experimental structure in place to make those assessments 
meaningful. 
3. Potential Improvements 
So what can be done to improve this assessment? My hypothesis is that it is 
possible to learn much more about the impact of activities like those that occurred during 
this exercise by associating the observational data—in this case a survey instrument, but 
it could be a behavior change, event count, or other observable—with specific geospatial 
information about where those activities took place. This creates a quasi-experimental 
                                                 
117 DigitalGlobe, Exercise Flintlock 2015 Population Study: Analysis of public awareness and support 
in Niger regarding Exercise Flintlock 2015, (Tampa, FL: DigitalGlobe, 2015). 
118 ORB International, Flintlock 2015 Survey, 6. 
 47 
design. The term “quasi” is used because the assignment to treatment and control is not 
random, as it is in a true experiment, and therefore subject to potential treatment bias. 
That treatment bias can then be overcome using statistical methods like matching, which 
I explore more thoroughly later.  
Figure 3 shows survey respondent locations in green and blue for wave 1 and 
wave 2.119 The locations of capacity building and civil-military engagement that took 
place between the two survey waves are identified by red circles (exaggerated so that 
they can be seen on the map). These were geolocated from unclassified reporting from 
the exercise. In Niger, Flintlock-related events and concurrent training and engagements 
occurred in Agadez and Diffa regions. In Agadez, SOF teams conducted training with 
Nigerien military forces, partnered with Nigerien military and civilian entities to conduct 
a medical outreach event, and conducted key leader engagements with civilian 
government and traditional leaders. There was also a U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID)-sponsored event at the mayor’s office in Agadez designed to 
improve transparency between local governance and the population. In Diffa region, U.S. 
SOF teams were training and advising Nigerien forces who were actively fighting cross-
border attacks by the extremist group Boko Haram. Also in Diffa region, SOF Civil 
Affairs teams partnered with Nigerien counterparts during the exercise period to conduct 
engagements with civilian and traditional leaders in Diffa town, Maine-Soroa, and 
N’Guigmi. 
Zooming into the city of Agadez, Figure 4 shows the geospatial assignment of 
treatment and control based on the locations of training and engagement events in the 
treatment window. I chose a one-kilometer radius for assignment to treatment. This 
choice is somewhat arbitrary, but that distance identifies respondents who have a high 
likelihood of personal exposure to the exercise activities and engagements. The survey 
data was not intentionally aligned with exercise event locations, so the one kilometer 
radius is necessary to incorporate clusters of survey respondents into the treatment group. 
                                                 
119 All figures were created using the R statistical software. Imagery imported using ggmap function: 
D. Kahle and H. Wickham, “ggmap: Spatial Visualization with ggplot2,” The R Journal 5, no. 1 (2013): 
144-161, http://journal.r-project.org/archive/2013-1/kahle-wickham.pdf. 
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Reducing the size of this treatment assignment window did not change the direction of 
the treatment effect but did reduce the statistical power of the results. Increasing the size 
of the assignment radius eliminates local control populations and threatens the internal 
validity of the result. The map in Figure 5 clarifies the assignment to treatment and 
control—showing the treatment group highlighted in red and the control group in black. 
 
Figure 3.  Survey respondent locations and Flintlock events 
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Figure 4.  Respondent and Flintlock events detail: Agadez 
 
Figure 5.  Treatment and control assignment: Agadez 
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4. Dependent Variables  
The demonstration in this chapter assesses the impact of Exercise Flintlock 
engagements on popular confidence in government institutions, in accordance with the 
theory of change constructed in Chapter III. That theory posits that if capacity is being 
built to engage more effectively with vulnerable populations, and that capacity is 
exercised in areas where those populations live, then the military and government will be 
viewed as more capable and legitimate. In this assessment, popular confidence in 
Nigerien governance institutions serves as a measure of the strength of the state’s 
competitive advantage.120 I also consider the impact of the exercise on confidence in U.S. 
institutions, because that was highlighted as a “measure of success” in the original 
assessment.121 Both of the dependent variables in this study are index variables, 
consisting of the sum of responses to several questions about confidence in various 
government institutions, both Nigerien and foreign. The appendix provides more 
information about these indices.  
C. METHODOLOGY 
1. Difference-in-Differences 
In order to assess the treatment effect, I used a statistical technique known as 
difference-in-differences—a form that comes from the field of econometrics and is 
frequently used to assess the impact of various kinds of social intervention.122 
Difference-in-differences is a version of fixed effects estimation for aggregate 
observational data, and uses the change in outcome for the control as representative of the 
unobserved counterfactual among the treated population.123 In this study, since it is 
impossible to measure the outcome for the treated population if the exercise did not 
                                                 
120 This philosophical choice is covered more thoroughly in Chapter 3, based on the Kilcullen’s theory 
of competitive control, Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 126. 
121 ORB International, Flintlock 2015 Survey, 6. 
122 For an example of this method in development intervention see U.S. Agency for International 
Development, MISTI Stabilization Trends and Impact Evaluation Survey Analytical Report, Wave 5: Sep 
28 – Nov 3, 2014 (Arlington, VA: Management Systems International), 330.  
123 Joshua D. Angrist and Jorn-Steffen Pischke, Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s 
Companion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 228. 
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occur, the change in the dependent variable among those that were not exposed to 
exercise events is assumed to be representative of the change that would have also 
occurred, in the absence of exercise events, among the entire population. According to 
Angrist and Pischke, the critical identifying assumption in the difference-in-differences 
method is that the trends would be the same for both treatment and control in the absence 
of treatment.124 Treatment causes a change from this common trend. Although the 
pretreatment values for treatment and control may be different, the continuation of this 
difference is accounted for by the treatment group unobserved effect, which accounts for 
fixed effects among the entire population.125 This parallel trend assumption is pictured in 
Figure 6.126 The short time-frame between treatment and the measurement of outcome in 
this study makes it particularly well-suited for the use of difference-in-differences causal 
estimation. Treatment effects demonstrated through difference-in-differences estimation 
are most reliable when there is a close temporal link between treatment and effect.127  
                                                 
124 Angrist and Pischke, Econometrics, 230. 
125 Angrist and Pischke, Econometrics, 230. 
126 Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health, “Difference-in-Differences Estimation,” 
accessed June 5, 2017, https://www.mailman.columbia.edu/research/population-health-methods/difference-
difference-estimation. 
127 Lyall, “Indiscriminate Violence,” 348. 
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Figure 6.  Difference-in-differences concept128 
In its simplest form, it is possible to calculate difference-in-differences treatment 
effect using arithmetic, by subtracting the differences in before and after means of both 
the control group and treatment group, and then subtracting those differences from each 
other.129 However, the use of a simple regression formulation allows the addition of 
covariates and an estimate of standard error and confidence intervals.130 This formula 
makes use of one dummy variable (0 or 1) that represents whether a respondent was in 
the treatment geography and another that indicates whether the respondent was surveyed 
before or after the treatment. A third variable represents the interaction between these 
two, and indicates those respondents that are both within the treatment geography and 
                                                 
128 Adapted from Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health, “Difference-in-Differences 
Estimation.” 
129 Michael Lechner, “The Estimation of Causal Effects by Difference-in-Difference Methods,” 
Foundations and Trends in Econometrics 4, no 3 (2010): 172. 
130 Lechner, “Estimation of Causal Effects,” 194. 
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surveyed after treatment. The following represents the difference-in-differences 
regression model:131 
Y= β0 + β1*[Treatment] + β2*[Time] + β3*[Treatment*Time] + β4*[Covariates]+ε 
 
where: 
Y is the outcome (dependent) variable.  
β0 is the intercept. 
β1 is the coefficient of the treatment dummy variable and estimates the mean 
difference between the treatment and control groups prior to the intervention. 
β2 is the coefficient of the time dummy variable that indicates whether the 
measurement was taken before or after the intervention. It estimates the mean change in 
outcome during the interval between these measurements among the control group. It 
serves as a type of fixed-effects control for any change that would have occurred in the 
absence of the intervention. 
β3 is the coefficient for the interaction term between the time and treatment 
dummy variables—this is the DD coefficient and estimates the treatment effect. It 
identifies the difference in the mean change in outcome between the treatment and 
control groups. This coefficient estimates the impact of the intervention on the dependent 
variable. 
β4 represents the effect of matched covariate controls. This study employs a total 
of nine variables in the matching process for age, gender, poverty level, media 
consumption, sense of security, and the four dominant ethnicities. 
2. Matching Frontier 
Even with the controls provided by the DD regression design, the very non-
random assignment into treatment and control creates a significant threat to internal 
validity and limits confidence in causal inference. Without randomized assignment, there 
                                                 
131 Regression equation is adapted from Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health, 
“Difference-in-Differences Estimation.” 
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is a significant risk of confounding, where the difference in observed outcomes is 
attributed to the intervention, but that difference is actually caused by another unobserved 
factor.132 One can only make an assessment of a causal relationship between treatment 
and outcome if assignment to treatment is independent of all other factors—as is the case 
in randomized experiments.133 Since random assignment of treatment will usually be 
impractical in the context of special warfare activities, alternative methods must be 
sought to overcome these threats to validity and gain greater clarity of cause and effect. 
In natural experiments and designed or ex post facto quasi-experimental studies, like the 
one described in this chapter, the statistical method known as matching can assist in the 
creation of treatment and control groups that are essentially identical on all observed 
covariates—a characteristic known as balance.134 Matching replicates randomization and 
reduces the potential impact of confounding by producing treatment and control groups 
that are only randomly different from one another for the observed covariates.135 It also 
greatly reduces model dependence in parametric regression analysis and moderates the 
large numbers of assumptions necessary in those models and the external information 
necessary to make those assumptions.136 
In order for matching to be considered a success, it must achieve greater balance 
between treated and control groups and also retain a sufficiently large and representative 
sample useful for estimating effects. King, Lucas, and Nielsen have proposed a method 
that optimizes the process of achieving balance between these two mandates—what they 
                                                 
132 Elizabeth A. Stuart, Eva DuGoff, Michael Abrams, and David Salkever, “Estimating Causal 
Effects in Observational Studies Using Electronic Health Data: Challenges and (some) Solutions,” eGEMs 
(Generating Evidence & Methods to improve patient outcomes) 1, no 3 (2013): 3, http://repository.edm-
forum.org/egems/vol1/iss3/4. 
133 Paul W. Holland, “Statistics and Causal Inference,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 
81, no 396 (1986): 945-960. 
134 Luke Keele, “The Statistics of Causal Inference: A View from Political Methodology,” Political 
Analysis 23, no. 3, (2015): 31. 
135 Stuart, et al., “Estimating Causal Effects,”  
136 Daniel E. Ho, Kosuke Imai, Gary King, and Elizabeth A. Stuart, “Matching as Nonparametric 
Preprocessing for Reducing Model Dependence in Parametric Causal Inference,” Political Analysis 15 
(2007): 209. 
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call the “matching frontier.”137 Their method identifies the treatment and control groups 
with maximum balance for each potential sample size. Visually, the result is a curved line 
(the frontier) that demonstrates the improvement in balance as the sample size is reduced 
(Figure 7).138 Their method also allows the researcher to quickly examine how improved 
balance and reduced sample size impacts the estimated effects and model dependence. 
In order to identify treatment and control groups that can more accurately account 
for the impact of the Flintlock exercise, I used the six previously identified covariates to 
construct a Mahalanobis matching frontier for the original sample. This method matches 
pairs of treatment and control units based upon a distance computation of the difference 
between the covariates. Balance is improved as the mean of these distances is reduced 
and respondents without a good match are eliminated from the sample. This reduced 
sample is then used in the difference-in-differences model to estimate the feasible sample 
average treatment effect on the treated (FSATT). This designation identifies the fact that 
any estimated causal effect only applies to those treated observations that have a good 
match.139 For simplicity, the FSATT will be referred to simply as the treatment effect. 
I used the R statistical program and the associated Matching Frontier statistical 
package to conduct the data processing, matching, and DD regression.140 The matching 
frontier for confidence in Nigerien institutions is shown in Figure 7. The shape of the two 
frontiers are nearly identical so the second is not shown; the primary difference between 
them is the size of the original sample—a larger number of non-responses for the second 
dependent variable (confidence in U.S. institutions) reduced its sample size. For both 
frontiers, balance improves quickly at first and then continues at a reduced rate as 
respondents are pruned. Figure 8 shows how this pruning affects the feasible sample.141 
                                                 
137 Gary King, Christopher Lucas, and Richard Nielsen, “The Balance-Sample Size Frontier in 
Matching Methods for Causal Inference,” American Journal of Political Science 61, no. 2 (2017): 473-489. 
138 King, et al., “Balance-Sample Size Frontier,” 24. 
139 Gary King, Richard Nielsen, Carter Coberley, James E. Pope, and Aaron Wells, “Comparative 
Effectiveness of Matching Methods for Causal Inference,” Unpublished Manuscript 15 (2011): 3. 
140 R Core Team, R; Gary King, Christopher Lucas, and Richard Nielsen. “MatchingFrontier: R 
Package for Computing the Matching Frontier,” R package version 1.0.0, 2015. 
141 The method for production and interpretation of these visuals is derived from King, et al., 
“Balance-Sample Size Frontier.” 
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Better balance is achieved in a sample that includes a higher percentage of ethnic Hausa. 
Additionally, the balanced sample has a higher level of exposure to traditional media 
(radio and television). Conversely, the balancing results in a sample with a lower average 
age and poverty level, so the balanced sample is younger and better-off than the whole. 
This process creates a smaller, more balanced sample for assessing impact, creating 
greater confidence in the resulting analysis but also limiting its applicability. The 
reduction did not significantly impact the strength of the findings, and, as I will show, 
only the strength of the impact is changed, not its direction. Despite this rigorous 
matching process, the presence of unobserved confounding factors is still possible and 
remains as a limiting factor for non-random experimental design. 
 
Figure 7.  Matching frontier for Nigerien institutional confidence 
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Figure 8.  Change in covariate means as balance improves 
D. RESULTS: ASSESSMENT OF TREATMENT EFFECT 
With the Matching Frontier identified, I then applied the difference-in-differences 
model to the matched dataset to estimate causal effects at each potential sample size. 
Figure 9a and 9b show the change in the treatment effect coefficient (black line), model 
dependence (red band), and 95% confidence intervals (purple band) for both dependent 
variables of interest as the sample becomes more balanced and more closely 
approximates a randomized experiment. For both dependent variables, model dependence 
remains fairly static, but the strength of the treatment effect, as indicated by the vertical 
distance from the dotted 0.0 line (null hypothesis), increases. For the impact on 
confidence in Nigerien institutions, the statistical power of the sample was not affected 
by the reduction in size and improved balance. However, for confidence in U.S. 
institutions, statistical power begins to fray after roughly 1000 observations have been 
pruned. Based on these characteristics, a balanced sample of roughly 800 observations 
was selected to identify the FSATT for confidence in Nigerien institutions and a balanced 
sample of roughly 900 was selected for assessing the impact on confidence in U.S. 
institutions. The substantive results of the difference-in-differences regression results for 
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these samples are shown in Table 2. For both of the dependent variables of interest, 
balancing resulted in the illumination of a stronger treatment effect.  
Two interesting and significant findings were identified through the difference-in-
differences analysis. The first strengthens an assertion made in the original assessment: 
the observation of a positive and statistically significant regression coefficient (p < 0.01) 
for treatment effect on confidence in U.S. institutions, indicating that these training 
events and engagements increased overall confidence in the U.S. government and 
military (Figure 9c). This identifies, with greater confidence, a positive impact of the 
exercise: improving the relationship between the United States and a critical regional 
partner in the fight against violent extremist groups in the Sahel. This improvement in 
goodwill serves to further U.S. objectives in the region and helps ensure the health of the 
long-term partnership between these nations. 
However, this finding is colored by an additional outcome that was not indicated 
by the original assessment: the observation of a negative and statistically significant 
regression coefficient (p < 0.01) for treatment effect on confidence in Nigerien 
institutions, indicating that these training events and engagements had a dampening effect 
on overall confidence in the military and government of the host nation (Figure 9d). This 
is a disappointing result and indicates that there is a counter-productive impact that needs 
to be addressed in future planning. Qualitative reporting from the exercise indicated that a 
combined patrol of exercise participants, both advisors and partner nation military forces, 
was interpreted incorrectly as an insurgent convoy, inciting a rumor that spread quickly in 
the town. This incident may have contributed to the result identified in the assessment 
and it only became visible once the population was separated into treatment and 
control—as those in closer physical proximity to training events would be more likely to 
be affected by the rumor.  
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Figure 9.  Treatment effect on institutional confidence
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Table 2.   Difference-in-differences regression 
 
 
This result highlights the fact that specific programmatic impact can sometimes 
be hidden within otherwise promising measures of effectiveness. In this instance, the 
directional change in mean is actually positive for both variables of interest, seemingly 
signaling a positive impact. However, the DD method identifies that for confidence in 
Nigerien institutions, the observed positive impact was actually lower than it should have 
been in the absence of treatment and thus the treatment effect is negative. At the time of 
the exercise there was a surge in violence perpetrated by Boko Haram in the south. The 
military responded effectively to those attacks, leading to a general surge in confidence in 
the government. The assessment appears to show that the exercise had a dampening 
effect on that surge in confidence. This effect is shown in Figure 10, which inputs the 
assessment data into the DD concept graph presented earlier. Without the use of quasi-




Figure 10.  Difference-in-differences for Nigerien institutional confidence 
The asymmetry of impact on the two dependent variables in this assessment 
demonstrates that populations are selective in their responses to the various entities 
involved in combatting violent extremist threats. The result is consistent with recent 
studies that examined the role that identity plays in responses to violence in irregular war. 
Lyall (2010) demonstrated that the identity of soldiers conducting cordon and search 
operations in Chechnya had a significant effect on patterns of violence following those 
operations.142 He found that operations conducted by pro-Russian Chechen forces were 
more effective than Russian-only sweeps, and that the productivity of Chechen-only 
forces did not transfer to a mixed force of Chechen and Russian counterinsurgents. 
Similarly, Lyall, Blair, and Imai (2013) demonstrated that civilian responses to insurgent 
and counterinsurgent violence in Afghanistan were contingent on the identity of the 
perpetrator and subject to intergroup bias.143 They showed that responses to post-
violence mitigation and assistance strategies were also dependent on the identity of the 
                                                 
142 Lyall, “Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents?” 18. 
143 Lyall, Blair, and Imai, “Explaining Support,” 696. 
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combatant, and that these post-harm aid strategies were especially effective in reducing 
support for the opponent.144 Similar to these studies, the results of the Flintlock impact 
assessment indicate that civilian populations will respond selectively to the component 
elements of a combatant coalition that includes both incumbent and foreign forces, and 
that the visible presence of foreign forces may have a normative influencing effect on 
attitudes toward the incumbent. 
I theorize that the large build-up of foreign and local military forces that occurs 
during an exercise like Flintlock, when compared to the small-footprint, low visibility 
approach that is typical of the special warfare approach, creates a descriptive norm with 
counter-productive effect. Essentially, a large presence of foreign forces creates the 
perception of an insecure environment or a state where domestic institutions are 
incapable of addressing security concerns on their own. This descriptive norm has the 
power to change perceptions and behavior and reduces the competitive advantage of the 
state. This effect is likely made even stronger by the inclusion of events where foreign 
forces are directly involved in the provision of essential services such as medical care. 
The fact that the assessment indicated a significant improvement in confidence in U.S. 
institutions means that the population understood who was responsible for the provision 
of care, even if attempts were made to conceal that responsibility. The increase in 
positive perceptions of the U.S. is an important result and should be appreciated in its 
own right. However, that positive impact does not automatically transfer to the partner 
government and military forces. Further study could identify mechanisms or engagement 
strategies that would mitigate this asymmetry of response.  
Certainly, this result leads to further questions that can only be answered through 
a program of designed and deliberate assessment of training results and social impact: Is 
the relative impact on the units being trained sufficient to overcome a possible setback in 
institutional confidence? Is the impact on confidence temporary? How can it be reversed? 
Was it incidental to the rumor and its impact or to the general surge in confidence? These 
questions should motivate the assessment process for future exercises and steady-state 
                                                 
144 Lyall, Blair, and Imai, “Explaining Support,” 693. 
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capacity-building operations. For special warfare practitioners, the assessment mandate 
should be particularly strong in permissive and semi-permissive areas where this type of 
evaluation is possible, that way the lessons-learned can be applied in non-permissive 
environments where it is not. 
In the following chapter, I will describe how these results affect the proposed 
theory of change, thus completing the cycle of theory, action, and assessment. I will also 
make recommendations for the application of these findings to current operational 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This thesis explored a deficit within current assessment practice for U.S. special 
warfare efforts and identified the concept of impact assessment as a means to improve 
causal inference for those activities and campaigns. A survey of other disciplines showed 
that impact assessment is a productive method to test the theoretical links between 
program and desired outcome. Those disciplines use randomized controlled trials or 
quasi-experimental assessments to evaluate the real impact of their interventions and then 
make iterative changes to program design or implementation. The application of impact 
assessment represents a philosophical choice to exert the effort necessary to understand 
how the changes observed in the environment are actually related to unit actions (or not). 
This thesis demonstrates that it is, indeed, possible to apply the rigorous methods 
necessary to make those connections, even in austere environments where foreign 
internal defense and other special warfare activities take place. The impact assessment 
demonstration was productive in identifying impact that was otherwise hidden in 
observational data, and it greatly improved understanding of cause and effect by more 
closely associating observed changes in institutional confidence with the capacity-
building activities of special operations forces in the country. This outcome was possible 
in spite of the weaknesses of the data, encouraging confidence that the results of a 
designed study would be even more convincing.  
B. COMPLETING THE CYCLE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY 
Substantively, the demonstration presented in Chapter IV identified a nearly equal 
and opposing impact of Flintlock events on confidence in U.S. and Nigerien institutions. 
This result is both encouraging and frustrating and should provide motivation for further 
study of the social impact of these activities. Returning to the cycle of theory, action, and 
assessment presented earlier, the impact assessment demonstration shows how 
assessment can be productive in testing and improving the theoretical understanding of 
cause and effect in a given environment. The results of that assessment indicate that an 
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additional caveat (or an additional “AND” statement) should be added to improve the 
theory. In order to reduce the normative influencing effect, capacity building operations 
must seek to minimize the presence or visibility of foreign advisors, trainers, and support 
personnel. Fortunately for proponents of the indirect approach, this minimalist approach 
represents the standard practice. A large exercise like Flintlock represents a departure 
from the discreet operational mode of special operations forces advising and assisting 
foreign forces. The addition of this component to the theory of change, shown in Figure 
11, does not dramatically change the logical pathway, but demonstrates how the cycle of 
theory, action, and assessment functions to improve understanding of cause and effect 
and limit the impact of spoilers and bias.  
The results of the assessment also highlight a critical flaw in the legal foundation 
of humanitarian civic action like the medical outreach event that occurred in Agadez. The 
legal authority for civic action, found in U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 401, mandates that 
U.S. forces participate directly in the provision of services in order to “promote the 
specific operational readiness skills of the members of the [U.S.] armed forces who 
participate.”145 That means that U.S. medics and doctors need to treat patients, or U.S. 
engineers need to be operating machinery. The results of the impact assessment and the 
asymmetric response to exercise events demonstrates that this policy is 
counterproductive. In the context of an indirect special warfare campaign, where U.S. 
forces are assisting a partner nation in the competition for legitimacy, the mandate to 
participate directly is an obstacle to more effective engagement. Instead, U.S. efforts 
should focus on supporting and funding civic action planned and executed by the partner 
military in order to create competitive advantage.146 
                                                 
145 “Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations,” 10 U.S.C 
§ 401 (2010), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/USCODE-2010-title10/USCODE-2010-title10-subtitleA-
partI-chap20-sec401. 
146 See Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 70-71. 
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Figure 11.  Updated theory of change 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Formulate a Complete Theory of Change 
As mentioned earlier, the logic model for civil engagement capacity building 
formulated here is incomplete, and future research could expand on this work to develop 
it further. The complexity of the modern conflict environment leads to divergence within 
the special warfare community about the correct approach and differing opinions about 
cause and effect. For the most part, these differences of opinion are built upon the real 
experiences of practitioners, but also on organizational culture and bureaucratic politics. 
A research process that leveraged these differences, and used design methodologies to 
construct a theory of change in reverse, from desired end state backward through 
intermediate outcomes to necessary actions, would contribute greatly to an improved 
understanding of cause and effect in special warfare. 
Part of that process would be the identification of links to other components and 
organizations that may be working in the same area. The causal pathways might run in 
parallel and overlap in certain areas. Awareness of those overlaps provides the ability to 
leverage one-another to bring about shared intermediate outcomes or end states. For 
example, consider a scenario where an interagency partner is working in the same area to 
improve links between vulnerable populations and legitimate governance, using local 
radio programming to do so. The second step of the theory of change I presented deals 
with the application of engagement capacity within areas vulnerable to extremism. If a 
SOF organization is working to build capacity and advising their partner force in the 
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application of that capacity, then the interagency radio effort could be leveraged to 
replicate and broadcast positive and productive interactions between civilian leaders and 
military forces. This would amplify the effect of those engagements, providing mutually 
beneficial outcomes.147 A cooperative design process would identify many such 
opportunities for collaboration and mutual support. At a minimum, special warfare 
campaigns should be designed using the theory of change method, with each component 
describing their assumptions about cause and effect and how their actions will contribute 
to the over-all objective. Then the theory can be used to design an impact assessment 
program to measure progress toward that goal. 
2. Design Assessment Structure Prior to Execution 
The primary weakness of the impact assessment presented in this thesis is its 
reliance on existing data that was not sufficiently aligned with exercise events and not 
intended to create distinct treatment and control groups for comparison of effect—this 
structure was created by the author after the fact. If that structure was designed into the 
assessment from the beginning, it would facilitate even stronger confidence in the 
resulting analysis by removing some of the geographic bias that is still present in this 
assessment. The design of such a study could identify matched zones of treatment and 
control prior to the exercise or training event, similar to the study of law enforcement 
strategy conducted Braga and Bond.148 Although that study’s randomized assignment of 
treatment is difficult in the context of capacity building and civil-military engagement, 
the statistical methods used in this thesis would greatly reduce threats to validity from 
confounding and treatment bias.   
Exercise Flintlock, along with other capacity building events like it, presents a 
unique opportunity to conduct assessment in a more controlled environment. Exercise 
planners and trainers exert a tremendous amount of influence over where exercise events 
                                                 
147 This strategy was adopted during the 2015 Flintlock Exercise in Chad. See U.S. Agency for 
International Development, 2015 Retrospective: Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Agency for International Development, 2016), 4, 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/CMC-2015-Retrospective.pdf (accessed 18 
August 2017). 
148 Braga and Bond, “Policing Crime and Disorder,” 582. 
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take place, what the participant forces will be doing, and with whom they will interact 
from among the civilian populations of the host nation. That level of control means that 
the possibility exists to conduct rigorous baseline assessment in the precise areas where 
exercise events will occur, and to identify very well-matched controls in areas where 
events will not take place. These advantages make Flintlock and other multi-national 
exercises an ideal venue for testing the components of special warfare engagement, so 
that those components can be applied with greater confidence in areas where that kind of 
assessment is difficult or impossible. 
3. Strengthen Assessment Requirements and Identify Funding 
Policy and authority documents play a critical role in governing the actions taken 
by deployed forces and those training to deploy for a specific mission. Executive orders 
and deployment orders for programs of record, like civil-military engagement (CME), 
should include more substantial instructions on when and where assessment is required. 
These documents should dictate that any shift in operational approach or area of 
responsibility requires a baseline assessment, that includes areas where no engagement is 
planned, to support the structure necessary for impact assessment with before and after 
measurement and a defined counterfactual. They should also elevate responsibility for 
continuity of assessment to the staff level at sub-unified commands like a theater special 
operations command (TSOC) or service component command. Rotational forces would 
obviously retain a great deal of responsibility in the process, but the staff would ensure 
that their actions fit into the broader structure that is supported by an assessment design. 
In the case of special warfare operations in Africa, this level of assessment management 
is limited to assessments of partner force capability only, and should also include an 
assessment structure for identifying the impacts of those forces on the environment and 
human domain. However, that additional responsibility would requirement additional 
manpower.  
In general, policy and authority documents should both mandate more rigorous 
assessment and provide the funding mechanism necessary to conduct it. These processes 
require funding to support paying for survey mechanisms and contracted personnel with 
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the necessary methodological expertise. One method to ensure that assessment is being 
conducted is to designate a certain percentage of program budget for use on assessment—
a technique used by the civilian foreign service agencies. Another method is the use of a 
centralized assessment contracting mechanism, like the Global Research and Assessment 
Program, a U.S. Special Operations Command contract designated for assessment of 
military information support operations. This program could be expanded to approach 
assessments more holistically, to include the political/social impacts of capacity building, 
CMO, and support to governance, in addition to the information-related programs that are 
currently assessed. Also, GRAP could be improved by incorporating quasi-experimental 
designs in its assessments. The GRAP contract is generally held by a large polling and 
research firm, like ORB International, that is capable of bringing on the necessary 
expertise to conduct the type of analysis required by the employer. The methods used in 
this paper would be within the scope of their expertise, and their implementation simply 
requires inclusion in the scope of work for a given assessment. 
4. Include Impact Assessment in Advanced Training for Special 
Warfare Practitioners 
Within the U.S. special operations community, Civil Affairs forces are given 
special responsibility for the impacts on human and social components of modern 
conflict. As a result, CA has a particular responsibility to incorporate the kind of impact 
assessment methods I have described, but they are not adequately trained to do so. 
Arguably, based on requirements laid out in their operational authority documents, the 
Psychological Operations community has done a much better job of incorporating 
training on assessment practice. For CA, there has been a great deal of discussion 
regarding the dearth of advanced training available at the Special Operations Center of 
Excellence at Ft. Bragg, including a number of important recommendations in the 2016–
2017 Civil Affairs Issue Papers.149 I agree with Daniels and Keay, who recommended the 
incorporation of data analytics for the measurement of structural fragility and its 
                                                 
149 Melton and Holshek, “Symposium Workshop Report,” xlvi. 
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correlation with conflict prevention activities.150 Additionally, I would add impact 
assessment and social science-based evaluation methods to draw stronger linkages 
between those activities and the observed effect. This advanced training and education is 
particularly important for officers and NCOs destined for positions in TSOCs and other 
sub-unified or joint commands. Last year’s issue paper summary discusses the draft 
Army Concept for Civil Affairs and its designation of the regiment as “the lead DOD 
‘human geography’ capability to engage civil societies and agencies by applying unique 
knowledge, skills, and abilities.”151 Some of that uniqueness should come in the form of 
distinctive competence in assessment of the social impact of military operations and 
plans. A more thorough understanding of the design and implementation of strong 
assessment programs would allow CA staff officers to effectively and accurately 
communicate the impacts of CA forces operating within their command, and describe 
how those tactical impacts are linked to operational effects.  
5. Narrow Focus for Greater Effect 
The assessment demonstration conducted in this thesis showed that concentrated 
capacity building effort in a relatively small area can produce observable impact. Without 
an assessment structure in place, it might be tempting for the small number of SOF 
elements in a particular area of operations to cast a wide net—to maximize the number of 
productive engagements and generate information from a wide area. But the philosophy 
of experimental design—thinking in terms of treatment and control—would motivate a 
more concentrated effort, in order to maximize the observable and attributable effect in a 
smaller area. This creates the need for more analytical thinking about prioritization of 
effort and a focus on more specific areas of interest where populations are most 
vulnerable to extremist influence. Intense focus on indigenous capacity in those specific 
areas will likely help to create resilient networks that can be expanded into outlying areas 
when the threat inevitably migrates. This is the ideal operational approach for SOF teams 
                                                 
 150 Clay Daniels and Morgan G. Keay, “Supporting the Trickiest Task: How Civil Affairs Can Bring 
Essential and Missing Capabilities to Geographic Combatant Command’s Mandate to Prevent Conflict,” in 
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and the requirement to assess the social impact of SOF missions can only encourage its 
employment. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The role of leaders in the assessment process cannot be overstated, because 
leaders have the ability to enable and incentivize a more dedicated pursuit of knowledge 
about cause and effect and create a culture of learning. If success is the only option, then 
teams will report successes and ignore things that look like failure, resulting in the loss of 
countless opportunities to learn from those failures. Astro Teller, the leader of X, 
Google’s so-called moonshot division, has cultivated a culture there that celebrates 
failure by rewarding teams that identify specific and convincing evidence that their 
project will not work. He describes a balance between “unchecked optimism,” and 
“enthusiastic skepticism,” that keeps the organization moving forward productively.152 
For special warfare practitioners, who are rightly optimistic about their methods because 
they have seen them work in the real world, I think a similar balance is required. They 
need to pair that optimism with a healthy amount of “enthusiastic skepticism” to identify 
what is actually working and what is not, and then adapt their theory, actions, and 
assessments in response.  
Impact assessment can provide valuable information for making adjustments to 
theory and actions so that the intended effect is achieved. If the goal of a partnership is to 
strengthen the competitive advantage of legitimate governance in the face of violent 
extremist groups that threaten stability, then SOF must focus the partnership on those 
activities that improve popular confidence in that governance. The two attacks that were 
described at the beginning of this thesis clearly demonstrate how productive relationships 
between security forces and vulnerable populations can tip the balance against insurgent 
and extremist forces. Rigorous impact assessment methods give practitioners an effective 
tool to understand the shifting dynamics of those relationships and focus on efforts that 
bring about a positive result. Without them, it is difficult to effectively communicate 
                                                 
 152 Astro Teller, “The Secret to Moonshots? Killing Our Projects,” WIRED, February 16, 2016, 
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success, and failures and unexpected results will surprise and confound us. Or worse, we 
will carry on without even knowing the failure occurred. 
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APPENDIX. INDEX VARIABLES 
A. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
(povindex) – Poverty Index: combines responses from five questions regarding 
access to basic commodities (water, fuel, electricity, food, and healthcare). High score = 
higher level of poverty. Response range is on a scale of 4–16. 
Component Questions: D6_A – D6_E. D6 base question: “For each of the 
following items, please tell me if your household has access to it always, often, rarely, or 
never. To begin, what about access to water for drinking and cooking—do you always, 
often, rarely, or never have access? And what about access to?” D6_A: “Water for 
drinking and cooking.” D6_B: “Fuel for heating and cooking.” D6_C: “Electricity in the 
home.” D6_D: “Enough food for the whole family.” D6_E: “Medical care when needed.” 
B. DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
(instconf) – Institutional Confidence Index: combines responses from three 
questions regarding confidence in Nigerien government institutions (central government, 
military, and police). High score = higher confidence. Response range is on a scale of 0 - 9. 
Component Questions: L1_A, L1_B, L1_C. L1 base question: “And now please 
tell me whether you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, 
or very unfavorable opinion of the following institutions.” L1_A: “Your national 
government.” L1_B: “Your military.” L1_C: “Your police.”  
(USconf) – U.S. Institutional Confidence Index: combines responses from two 
questions regarding confidence in United States government institutions (government, 
and military). High score = higher confidence. Response range is on a scale of 0 - 6. 
Component Questions: L1_F, L1_G. L1 base question: “And now please tell me 
whether you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very 
unfavorable opinion of the following institutions.” L1_F: “The U.S. Government.” L1_G: 
“The U.S. military.”  
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